W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects

Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects

2010

"Hearty Damnations" and "Ordered Resistance": Protest, Profit,
and Power in Colonial Charleston, 1769
Molly FitzGerald Perry
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd
Part of the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
Perry, Molly FitzGerald, ""Hearty Damnations" and "Ordered Resistance": Protest, Profit, and Power in
Colonial Charleston, 1769" (2010). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539626633.
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-1b1m-rq70

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

"H earty D am nations" and "O rdered Resistance":
Protest, Profit, an d Pow er in Colonial Charleston, 1769.

Molly FitzGerald Perry
Louisville, Kentucky

B.A. M iddlebury College, 2004

A Thesis presented to the G raduate Faculty
of the College of W illiam an d M ary in Candidacy for the Degree of
M aster of Arts

The Lyon G. Tyler D epartm ent of H istory

The College of W illiam and M ary
May, 2010

APPROVAL PAGE

This Thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

fy FitzGfi/ald Perry

Approved by

rch 15, 2010

Corrirbltte*

Professor Brett Rushfortf
The College of William and Mary

Professor Paul Mapp
The College of William and Mary

Professor Frederick Corney
The College of William and Mary

ABSTRACT PAGE
In the hot, dry summer of 1769 something extraordinary occurred in the bustling port of
Charleston. After two years of resisting calls from their “sister colonies” to protest, within
two weeks Charleston possessed two mutually antagonistic associations calling for halting
imports. Where once “silent Neglect” met appeals for resistance to the Townshend
Revenue Acts, by the summer of 1769 concerned Charleston residents exchanged “bitter”
accusations of complicity and a cacophony of “aspersions” against Parliamentary tyranny.
In a city long “famous for our Harmony,” each port resident - from the wealthiest merchant
to the poorest Jack Tar - faced choices; this thesis seeks to recreate how contemporaries
understood this moment of contested protest and their own involvement. To dissect how
colonists came to protest, this paper examines how Charleston residents understood their
position within the British Empire, traces how conflict over protest arrived amid inaction,
and uncovers the drive by the anxious whites towards consensus amid a community
characterized by a majority enslaved and restive sailor population. In capturing the range
of possibilities for Charleston citizens, the narrative suggests how individuals calculated
risk versus reward to engage in protest, why protest emerged within this community, and
the relationship of these protests to the coming revolution.
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For H. Timothy Perry
I f Not For You...

Teeming with commerce, the piers of colonial Charleston
"appear[ed]" as if "a...floating market." Boats from across the Atlantic
unloaded goods while great "num bers of Canoes [and river] Boats"
brought plantation crops dow n river to ocean vessels converging on
the bustling port city.1 A merchant from N ewport w andered the
streets of Charleston in 1764, dazed at the city's meteoric population
growth accompanied by a building boom of what he judged to be the
most "handsome houses" in all the American colonies. From the busy
wharves dow n Broad Street, the city unfolded before him into an
impressive "new w orld."2 At the center of town, the new State House
and St. Michael's Church dom inated the skyline, while surrounding
shops sold every possible necessity and luxury for "cash or credit."
The center of trade for the Southern region, Charleston glittered
as a bright star in the constellation of the British ports, intimately
connected to harbors in the West Indies, the Northern Colonies,
Southern Europe, Africa, and the British Isles. With boats coming and
going daily from St. Augustine, Poole, Salem, Tortuga, London,
Falmouth, Philadelphia, Rhode Island, Antigua, Halifax, Firth,
1 Leila Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of the American Revolution. (New York A m o Press,
1970), 5; Edward Pearson, “’Planters Full o f Money:’ The Self-Fashioning o f the Eighteenth
Century South Carolina Elite,” in Money, Trade, and Power, Evolution of Colonial South Carolina’s
Plantation Society, eds. Jack P. Greene, Rosemary Brana-Shute, and RandyJ. Sparks (Columbia:
University o f South Carolina Press, 2001), 312-3.
2 In 1730, Charleston merchants gained an exception to the Navigation Acts allowing direct
importation o f rice into Southern Europe without first shipping through English ports. Public
Records o f South Carolina MSS, XXTV, 313, hereafter cited as P.R.S.C.; Leila Sellers, Charleston
Business on the Eve of Revolution (New York A m o Press, 1970), 5.
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Jamaica, Newcastle, St. Christopher, Boston, New York, Grenada,
Beaufort, Georgia, Bordeaux, Liverpool, Lisbon, Oporto, Barbados,
Cork, and Georgetown, Charleston's consumers literally possessed the
world at their fingertips.3 Local newspapers brim m ed with
advertisements announcing the arrival of the latest ships bringing a
"Compleat ASSORMENT of German, Dutch, Russia, and Flemish"
cloth, "French horns, trumpets, and fiddles," "Dutch herrings," and
commodities from "LONDON and BRISTOL" into their store.
Customers who read these advertisements for all variety of "VERY
CHEAP" imports, learned that merchants also offered "empty cases,
stone jugs, dripping stones, RUM and other SPIRITS, MADERA,
MALMAY, VIDONIA and OTHER WINES" from Europe and the West
Indies.4 Reflecting this opulence, Charleston's elite merchants and
planters fashioned their city - America's fourth largest - as a brick and
m ortar testimony to their economic and political dominance.
W hen Charleston's wealthiest residents stepped from their
"sum ptuous houses" onto the street, they contacted a vibrant and
raucous port tow n primarily inhabited by sailors, slaves, and

3 This list o f ports, com es from a Marine list on The South Carolina Gazette, November 23,1769,
January 12, 1769; from Edward Pearson, “’Planters Full ofM oney:’ The Self-Fashioning o f the
Eighteenth Century South Carolina Elite,” 312-3.
4 For this paper, I have maintained the misspellings, capitalizations, and italics from the primary
sources, both to preserve accuracy as well as emphases. The South Carolina Gazette, January 12,
1769.
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mechanics (independent shopkeepers and artisans).5 The trade in rice
and indigo that enriched Charleston's wealthy planters and merchants
required the labor of lower classes - who in turn supported the stores,
dramshops, tippling houses, brothels and inns that lined the city's
wharves and lanes. From the marketplace to the streets, colonial
Charleston was a dynamic place of interaction and contest defined by
the constant movement of bodies and goods in and out of port.
In the hot, dry summer of 1769 something extraordinary
occurred in this bustling port city. After two years of resisting calls
from their "sister colonies" to protest, within two weeks Charleston
possessed two m utually antagonistic associations calling for halting
imports. Where once "silent Neglect" met appeals for resistance to the
Townshend Revenue Acts, by the summer of 1769 concerned
Charleston residents exchanged "bitter" accusations of complicity and
a cacophony of "aspersions" against Parliamentary tyranny.6 In a city
long "famous for our Harmony," each port resident - from the
wealthiest merchant to the poorest Jack Tar - faced choices; this essay
seeks to recreate how contemporaries understood this m oment of
contested protest and their own involvement. To dissect how colonists
came to protest, this paper examines how Charleston residents

5 Edward Pearson, “’Planters Full o f Money:’ The Self-Fashioning o f the Eighteenth Century
South Carolina Elite,” 313.
6 P.R.S.C. (British Transcripts), XXXII, p. 56;
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understood their position within the British Empire, traces how
conflict over protest arrived amid inaction, and uncovers the drive by
the anxious whites tow ards consensus amid a community
characterized by a majority enslaved and restive sailor population. In
capturing the range of possibilities for Charleston citizens, the
narrative suggests how individuals calculated risk versus rew ard to
engage in protest, why protest emerged within this community, and
the relationship of these protests to the coming revolution.7
The People of Charleston

In his regular reports to London, Lieutenant Governor William
Bull Jr. described the population of Charleston for the King's ministers.
Counting only the white residents, Bull estimated that approximately
5,030 individuals resided w ithin the city. From this total, Bull preceded
- like most Charleston residents - to sort the propertied individuals
into one of three 'interested' classes.8 This demarcation is best
understood as akin to m odern political parties (people of shared
economic, ideological, and social position), rather than an immutable
socio-economic class.9 Throughout the colonial period, propertied

7 This paper seeks to complicate the narrative established by Pauline Maier’s From Resistance to
Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development ofAmerican Opposition to Britain, 1765- 1776. (New
York: Norton 1972).
8 William Bull to early o f Hillsborough, October 18, 1768, PRO, reel 10, vol. 32; Richard Walsh,
Charleston’s Sons cfUberty: A Study of the Artisans, 1763- 1789 (Columbia: University o f South
Carolina Press 1968),ix.
9 The multifarious business investments and partnerships o f Charleston leave these interest
groups appearing - in retrospect —amorphous and impossibly confused. Historians have
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whites identified themselves as members of either the planter,
mechanic, or m erchant groups. In principle, each faction organized
around their distinct economic interest and political ideologies; for
example, they selected their own candidates for office and, when
necessary, petitioned the home government independently. In
practice, groups vigorously jockeyed for power within the colonial
port.
Newspaper broadsides illustrate the interwoven economics of
the propertied interests. Advertisements frequently publicized the
variety of wholesale goods merchants m arketed to mechanics,
reported runaw ay slaves leased to mechanics by planters, and
described partnerships of planters and merchants speculating in
plantation land. Together the planter and merchant interests
dom inated Carolina politics to the determent of Charleston's mechanic
interest (as well as backcountry residents and the colony's nonpropertied residents), by requiring that members of the Commons
House of Assembly - the only elected branch of colonial governm entpossess at least five hundred acres of land and ten slaves (or the

attempted to sort individuals disc reedy and to treat these categories as markers o f future
Revolutionary allegiance, but I find the categories prove woefully problematic. The interest
groupings are important in the various alliances, but simply are not reflected in the unchanging
lists o f individuals that some historians have produced. For another historian’s treatment, see
Richard Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty: A Study of the Artisans, 1763- 1789 (Columbia: University
o f South Carolina Press 1968), ix.
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equivalent value in city property).10 When economic w inds shifted,
however, this traditional merchant-planter collusion devolved into
competition. In a business climate that encouraged the pursuit of
economic gain in every possible form, political sympathy and
economic self-interest often ran in multiple directions and constantly
adjusted in response to local and imperial conditions.
The semi-fluid, semi-rigid categories of merchant, mechanic and
planter into which contemporaries sorted themselves substantially
influenced political discourse in Charleston. Contemporaries

*

understood the political climate through the perspectives of their
respective group, and participated in protest accordingly. The
demarcation of group membership, however, proves nearly impossible
to generalize in retrospect. For example, Christopher Gadsden was
often referred to as "the Sam Adams of the South" and served a
leading light of the mechanics, but also owned substantial tracks of
plantation land (so could be a member of the planter interest), as well
as, a large shipping w harf (similar to many of the members of the
merchant interest). In the economics and politics of Charleston, these
alliances m attered in the day-to-day running of the port, as well as, to
contemporary's understanding of their place within the British Empire.

10 Jonathan Mercantini, Who ShallKule at Home? The Evolution of South Carolina Political Culture, 1748
— 1776 (Columbia: The University o f South Carolina Press, 2007), 4.
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The majority of Charleston's residents lived their lives outside
of the propertied interests. Observing their city, their colony, and their
Empire, the 'interested classes' (i.e. merchant, planter, mechanic)
defined themselves against these colonial 'others' including - an
enslaved black majority, angry farmers tilling the backcountry, nearby
Native Americans, the ever-threatening Spanish and French colonists,
and countless itinerate sailors who daily arrived in the city from
around the world. Despite their "Grand Modell" for a genteel town,
Charleston elites uneasily coexisted with these 'other' port denizens,
often complaining of the "abandonly rude, unmannerly, insolent, and
shameless" behavior of the city's lower-class sailor and slave majority.
As elites drove through the city in sedan chairs and carriages, they
spoke bitterly of idle slaves and sailors playing dice, smoking pipes,
and "profanely swearing, cursing, and talking obscenely."11 Despite
its reputation for harmony, even at the best of tim es- when rice prices
boomed and trade buoyed the economic fortunes of all - tensions
abounded within Charleston. At times of crisis and economic decline,
the uneasy consensus threatened to collapse.
The Coming of Townshend -1 7 6 5 -1 7 6 7

11 Historian Philip Morgan estimates that black slaves alone constituted over fifty-two percent o f
the capital’s population, in Philip Morgan, “Black Life in Eighteenth-Century Charleston,”
Perspectives in American History (1984); 188; Edward Pearson, “’Planters Full o f Money:’ The SelfFashioning o f the Eighteenth Century South Carolina Elite,” 218.
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The euphoria in Charleston following the repeal of the Stamp
Act quickly devolved into a period of crisis for the laboring classes. By
1765, an acute shortage of paper currency and w idespread freezing of
credit brought financial hardship on the majority of Charleston's
mechanics - the propertied small storekeepers and artisans - trickling
down to those below.12 As wealthy merchants dem anded the
repaym ent of loans, the "industrious" classes of Charleston lamented
that a "Man, who does not earn more than Thirty or Forty Shillings in
the Day (and few do that) cannot possibly pay House-Rent, Cloath and
feed his family."13 Amid these dire economic straights, the South
Carolina Gazette published the first news of the Townshend Revenue

Acts, legislation designed to raise funds by imposing duties on all
glass, lead, paint, paper, and tea imported into America - goods
central to the daily income of Charleston's small businessmen.

12 For many mechanics, including most future Son’s o f Liberty, the 1760s proved a time o f debt.
Hard times, as historian Richard Walsh illustrates, touched the m ost important members o f the
mechanic’s interest, the most radical segment o f Charleston’s propertied political participants.
Tunis Tebout, for example, remained constantly in debt between 1766 and 1770, owing about
£4,479 to various merchants, forcing him to curtail his operations, dissolve partnerships, and sell
his slaves, coastal schooner, and his “boat negroes.” A fellow mechanic and Liberty Tree regular,
Benjamin Hawes similarly owed more than £2,260, and found himself completely insolvent by
1770, when the Fellowship Society ofCharleston offered him financial aid. From TheSouth
Carolina Gazette, October 13, 1767, May 2, 1768, October 5, 1769, May 30,1769; Miscellaneous
Court Records, 1770-1771, 98 -100, 110,264, 338, 374,392-393; Records o f the Court o f
Common Pleas, 1767,135,178, 211, 212,272-274,393-396; Minute Book o f the Fellowship
Society, 1769-1779; Converse D. Clowse, Measuring Charleston’s Overseas Commerce, 1717- 1767:
Statisticsfrom the Port’s Naval hist (Washington, D. C.: University Press o f America), 1982, 157.
Richard Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty: A. Study of the Artisans, 1763- 1789 (Columbia: University
o f South Carolina Press 1968), 43.
13 The South Carolina Gazette, February 2, 1765; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 43.
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In June 1767, the initial reports of Townshend filtered from
ships into South Carolina's newspapers, reporting in addition to a new
round of duties, measures to create a Board of Customs
Commissioners for enforcement. By empowering the collection
alongside enumerating novel taxes, Parliament made clear its intention
that revenue was to be extracted from the American colonies, by force
if necessary. For Charleston's mechanics, like painters George Flagg
and Benjamin Hawes, these new duties threatened to double the cost
of their business by raising the price of painter's colors and white lead.
Stationers, lawyers, and printers faced a levy on the paper vital to their
trades; cabinet makers, builders, and glazers faced new duties raising
the cost of glass central to construction.14 For South Carolina's
planters, who borrowed money extensively to grow cash crops and
purchase slaves, the renewed duties threatened to drain all hard
currency from the colony. Planters and mechanics - who owed money
to merchants in Charleston and London - increasingly found
themselves unable to pay off their debts. With foreclosure rates and
bankruptcies rising, the future appeared increasingly uncertain.
Rumors spread, as well, of the Townshend Revenue Act
bolstering the powers of American courts to aid customs officers in the
enforcement of laws. The seizure of a pair of coastal schooners
14 Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 44; Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 113.
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belonging to Henry Laurens - a prominent citizen, merchant, and (at
the time) politically m oderate member of the Commons House followed by a public trial and vitriolic countersuits, confirmed
Charleston residents' worst suspicions.15 Actions by imperial officials
struck fear into sailors, captains, and merchants alike - around the
port, customs officials became as dirty a word as 'im pressm ent.' In a
widely circulated series of pamphlets about his experience and public
trial, Laurens boldly w arned that "such officers" and juryless courts
were "most likely.. .to effect a disunion between the Mother Country
and her American offspring," a bold statement among Charleston's
elites.16
The use of the new duties for "new commissioners of the
customs" particularly irritated many Charleston residents - who, in
alignment with radical Whig thought - viewed the officials as mere
"placemen, parasitical and novel ministerial" officers, abusing their
powers by unnecessarily m eddling with coastal trade and "sweat[ing]"
money from honest businessmen "under the color of law."17 Indeed,
in an infamous tale, Henry Laurens was apparently so incensed by

15 Prior to efforts o f imperial regulation, customs officials did not interfere with coastal trade - a
trade which was vital to transporting cash crops to market, even as
16 Henry Laurens, “Extracts from the Proceedings o f the Court o f Vice-Admiralty” in Phillip M.
Hamer, ed., The Papers of Henry Taurens (Columbia: The University o f South Carolina Press, 1968),
273-79,283-84; Robert M. Weir, “The Scandalous History o f Sir Egerton Leigh,” The William and
Maty Quarterly 3.26 (January 1969): 53.
17 Public Records o f South Carolina MSS, XXXII, 56, hereafter cited as P.R.S.C.; Sellers.
Charieston Busin ess on the Eve of the American Revolution, 204.
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their actions and "extortions" that upon spotting the offending
customs official on Charleston's busy street, he barated the gentleman
and twisted his nose. W ord of the incident between a representative of
the crown and one of the colony's most respected businessmen quickly
spread throughout the colony. For the mechanics and planters directly
affected, a widespread conspiracy against Charleston residents' liberty
and rights as Englishmen appeared afoot. The solution was clear: the
offending legislation must be resisted and repealed. As during the
Stamp Act Crisis - a mere three summers earlier - Charleston must
again resume non-importation.18
Response to the Townshend Revenue Acts - Inaction

By November 1767, reports of the northern protest movement
filtered into South Carolina's three major newspapers.19 Non
importation associations formed in Boston, then spread to ports
throughout the North. Charleston, however, stayed aloof to calls for
cooperation. For over a year - even as John Dickinson's incendiary
pro-non-importation "Letters from a Pennsylvania Farmer" appeared
in Charleston's newspapers alongside local writers warning that a
"most imminent danger threatens" our liberty - the port ignored the

18 Sellers. Charleston Business on the Eve of the American Revolution, 203; Carol Lynn Knight. The
American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis 1766 — 1770: A Study in Political Imagery. (Lewiston:
The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990),77.
19 Knight. The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis 1766 — 1770. 119 —124.
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growing movement of non-importation elsewhere.20 Despite
exuberant toasts to liberty and celebrations of English patriots that
followed the repeal of the Stamp Act, the booming port city appeared
unwilling to resume a regime of "strict OECONOMY" in response to
the Townshend Revenue Acts.21 Continued inaction in Charleston
came not from a consensus of the majority, but the power of the
merchant minority. For over a year, letters from Boston merchants to
their Charleston peers urging cooperation and resistance "were
handed from m an to man," Lieutenant Governor William Bull Jr.
reported to London, with "silent Neglect."22
Charleston's economic success depended upon the daily
movement of sailors and slaves in and out of the port. For reasons of
profit and potential unrest, Charleston's merchant interest deeply
feared any disruption to this status quo. Recalling the tum ult in the

20 Charleston’s newspapers also contained information and updates from London about
machinations in Parliament. “I fear little will be done for America the next session” reported one
letter, “ for the Common will not be settled til late in the season.” But also included information
about changes in the ministry, including changes due ID the ministers’ ill health and possible
deaths. The South Carolina and America General Gazette, November 13, 1767, November 20, 1767;
The South C arodnaG a le tte ,T )tc tv c b tt\A ,1767, March 14,1768, April 25, 1768, September 16,
1768, September 23,1768, October 11, 1768; The South Carolina Gazette and Country Journal\
January 5, 1768; Knight The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis 1766—1770. 89, 94 —

96.
21 The South Carolina Gazette, June 22, 1769.
22 Boston adopted a non-importation agreement in October 1767, and most o f the northern
colonies soon followed. February 1768, Massachusetts sent the circular letter challenging the
constitutionality o f the Townshend Acts and asking for cooperation among the colonies in
securing their repeal. Throughout the colonies, petitions were drawn in response and forwarded
by assemblies to colonial agents in London to be presented to the King. Events beyond the
Townshend Acts themselves, such as their seizure o f John Hancock’s sloop Liberty and the
quartering controversy in Boston and N ew York also hastened pressure for action. P.R.S.C.
(British Transcripts), XXXII, p. 56; Leila Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of the Aon erican
Revolution. (New York A m o Press, 1970), 204.
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streets during the Stamp Act Crisis, Charleston's m erchant interest
proved uninterested in upending the port's stable peace with protest.
Loathe to exacerbate hostilities between the colonies and Parliament,
the powerbrokers in Charleston reached a consensus of their own in
1767 to operate solely within approved channels.23 To limit potential
risk, the merchants preferred a campaign of direct petitioning in
London 24 For a growing segment in Charleston, however, after two
years of waiting it was clear this limited response had failed. Outrage
against Townshend duties burst from the planters and mechanics
whose personal incomes were most directly endangered.
Supporters of resuming non-importation - supporters of direct
action - gathered in March 1768 under a large live-oak tree in Mr.
Mazyck's pasture to celebrate the anniversary of the Stamp Act repeal.
Mere blocks from the State House, the Liberty Tree served as a
gathering place "where many loyal, patriotic, and constitutional toasts,
were drank," often beginning, continuing, and ending w ith cheers of
support of John Wilkes. It was under this tree, in the joyous days
following the Stamp Act repeal that Christopher Gadsden first warned
23 One reason for the apparent lethargy o f Charleston merchant was a petitioning campaign
underway by their agents in Great Britain. Several North American provinces all petitioned for
repeal, and reports from England indicated that the duties would soon be removed. Agents also
sent word that Stamp Act-like disturbances would not be smiled upon in London, thus hurting
chances for a quick repeal o f the offending legislation. The South Carolina Gazette and Country
Journal, July 25,1769; The South Carolina Gazette July 8, 1769; P.R.S.C. XXXII, 56.
24 For the large export merchants or factors, Parliament appeared to be passing beneficial
legislation aiding their British parent firms in collecting debts and expanding markets for
Carolina’s burgeoning rice industry.
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of the dangers of the Declaratory Act, where mechanics chose
candidates for office, and where "orderly" assemblies often gathered
to proceed into town. In the past these crowds had been seen
"carrying [45] lights...dow n King street and Broad-street" into a tavern
"where 45 bowls of punch, 45 bottles of wine, and 92 glasses"
emerged, and participants spent "a few hours in a new round of
toasts" celebrating the "Patriots of Britain and America."25
On this occasion, however, "it was observed" reported the South
Carolina Gazette "that spirits were dampened by the late revenue act."

The most somber toasts were drunk in honor of Massachusetts and the
Pennsylvania Farmer w ith mighty cheers for "Perseverance and
Success to AMERICAN MANUFACTURES."26 Despite meetings,
pamphlets, and speeches, the participants - largely mechanics and
their sympathizers - felt little optimism for the resum ption of protest
in Charleston.
The Summer of Our Discontent - The Renewal of Protest in Charleston

By early June 1769, a m arked change appeared underw ay in
Charleston as "a kind of enthusiasm swept the city."27 W riting to his
superiors in London, Lieutenant Governor Bull rescinded his prior

25 The tree suffered during the Revolutionary War, destroyed by British invading the city.
Splintered and burned, shards o f the tree were then kept as mementoes, including one o f the
gnarly roots made into a cane for Thomas Jefferson. Description o f Liberty tree and celebrations
from The South Carolina Gazette, October 3, 1768.
26 The South Carolina Gazette, March 23,1769; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 46.
27 Wiliam Bull to Earl o f Hillsborough, October 18, 1768, PRO, reel 10, vol. 3 2
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assessment of peace in the port. With their fires stoked by the "most
determined leaders" acting as "tribunes of the people," an alliance of
mechanics and planters gathered "in Taverns" and "under the Liberty
Tree" in opposition to the Townshend Revenue Acts.28 "Loud cries"
now "silence the weaker voices of moderation" as energetic leaders at
the vanguard of non-importation effectively rallied Charleston
residents into "see[ing] how far they could follow the laudable
example" of New York and Boston.29 These "movers of the grand
machine" appeared increasingly "obstinate in urging to extremity"
every "opinion."30
Buried between an obituary for "Mrs. Susannah Bee.. .a Lady of
so amiable...a Disposition as renders her Death a Loss to Society" and
an apologetic correction for earlier "MISINFORMATION" reporting a
"marriage between Benjamin Elliott and Miss Sanders," the South
Carolina Gazette informed its thorough readers on June 15,1769 that

"Several Societies of Gentlemen in this Town" had formed in protest.
Mere weeks after merchants earned praise from imperial ministers for

8 William Bull Jr. described the leaders as “Thomas Lynch who, tho’ a man o f sense is very
obstinate” in his opinions, Christopher Gadsden “a violent enthusiast in the cause” who
“maintains with great vehemence the most extravagant claims o f American exemptions,” and
‘John Mackenzie, whose education at Cambridge ought to have inspired him with more dutiful
sentiment. P.R.S.C., XXXII, 416; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 48.
29 The South Carolina Gazette, June 1, 8, 15, 1769; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons fLiberty, 47-49.
30 William Bull Jr. to Earl o f Hillsborough, October 18,1768, Public Records Office, reel 1 0 ,vol.
32; Daniel J. McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens: the Parallel Lives of Two American
Patriots. (Sellingsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2000), 103-4; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of
Liberty, 47-9; P.R.S.C. XXXII, 5<>57.
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"act[ing] like A WISE AND PRUDENT people" by ignoring non
importation, the first association since the Stamp Act vowing to
"purchase no kind of British Goods that can be manufactured in
America," circulated around Charleston.31 Agreeing to "cloathe
themselves in hom espun as soon as it can be got," this first revive non
importation association precipitated a tense standoff within the port.32
The Strategy of Non-Importation

Response to the challenge of the non-importation association to
"SIGN or BE RUINED" occurred along lines of economic interest and
political ideology.33 As a strategy of dissent, signers of the association
believed that non-importation and non-consumption association could
gravely injure British commerce effectively awakening British
merchants - so "they w ould see, they would feel, the oppressions we
groan under, and exert themselves to procure Us redress." Some
believed that American colonists practicing frugality and supporting
local m anufacturing would unleash "such a disturbance" among
unem ployed Englishmen "at home as would endanger the heads and
necks" of the authors of the offending laws.34 Additionally, non
importation offered a peaceful and effective form of protest within

31 The South Carolina Gazette, June 15, 1769; The South Carolina Gazette, June 22, 1769; William
Henry Drayton, Tetters of Freeman (London, 1771), 1-5.
32 The South Carolina Gazette, June 1, July 22,1769.
33 The South Carolina and American General Gazette, July 10, 17, 1769.
34 Maier, From Ted stance to Revolution, 114 - 119; William Henry Drayton, Tetters i f Freeman
(London, 1771), 111, 141; Knight, The American Colonial Tress and theTownshend Crisis 95.
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Charleston, by not encouraging anarchy or disorder among the lower
sorts w ithin Charleston - non-importation, it was argued, relocated
dissent from the street to the spinning wheel.
With the export trade in rice and indigo booming, merchants
continued to feel little concern about the specific Townshend duties.
Any wholesale price increase could simply be passed to the consumer,
whereas a renewed boycott necessarily entailed financial risk.
Additionally, the central benefits of non-importation extolled at length
in newspapers - a development of domestic manufacturing, the
halting of the slave trade, and saving of money through frugality directly threatened the lucrative business of Charleston's merchants.35
Conversely, planters and mechanics actually benefited from non
im portation schemes because they ensured financial solvency for those
in debt and lowered prices of goods, while developing new business
w ithin the port.36 After two years of delay, the first June issue of the
South Carolina Gazette ushered in a summer where - at the intersection

of self-interest and ideology - a contested protest reemerged in a city
famous for its harmony.

35 The South Carolina and America General Gazette, November 13, 1767; South Carolina and America
General Gazette, November 20,1767; South Carolina Gazette, December 14, 1767.
36 The list o f goods proscribed for importation also varied from colony to colony, and in the
South agreements tended to emphasize non-consumption over non-importation. The South
Carolina and American General Gazette, September 4, 1767, December 25,1767, January 1, 1768; The
South Carolina Gazette, October 5,1767; Knight. The American Colonial Tress and theTownshend Crisis
1766 — 1770. 83-4, 92-3, 113; Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 115.
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The first non-importation pledges, drafted and signed by the
mechanics and planters, resulted in a scheme of protest that struck fear
into the hearts and pocketbooks of Charleston's powerful merchant
interest.37 Aware that remaining aloof only invited more extreme
measures, the m erchant interest gathered on June 30 at Dillon's tavern
to discuss their response to the sudden challenge of non-importation.38
Hoping to reassert the traditional merchant-planter alliance, the
meeting selected a committee to draft a rival non-importation
association. On July 7, the merchants "in a Num ber near eighty"
presented their scheme "w ithout one differenting voice."39 The South
Carolina Gazette broadside announced the merchants' association and

their letter below a reprinting of the first non-importation association
(including an additional, italicized clause urging unity behind a single
protest organization) and a preemptive response by "A Mechanic."40
On a single broadside, Charleston residents faced two contested
protest associations. In less than a month, the port city that had for two
years avoided action now possessed two mutually antagonistic
organizations.

37 The South Carolina Gazette, July 13,1769.
38 The South Carolina Gazette, June 22, 1769; July 6, 13, 1769; William Henry Drayton, Tetters of
Freeman, 1-5; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons ofEiberty, 47-8; Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of the
A. merican Revolution, 207.
39 The South Carolina Gazette, July 22, 1769; The South Carolina and America General Gazette,July 17,
1769.
40 By this time, the publisher o f The South Carolina Gazette, Peter Timothy, was an ardent
supporter o f the radical interests, as w illb e examined in the note on sources below.
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The Charleston residents who signed their names to any and all
of the non-importation associations risked economic loss, potential
retribution by British authorities, and the constant possibility of
disorder from the majority population of impoverished sailors and
slaves. As they read the paper and discussed politics, individuals
formed opinions of recent events through the lenses of political
traditions and perceptions of their place in the Empire. In choosing to
protest - in weighing the potential of risk versus the possibilities of
rew ard - contemporaries reveal how people oriented themselves
within the community, colony, and Empire. At an exceptional
moment, one that challenged individuals to take action (or in the case
of boycott, inaction), w hat can we learn by studying this protest? In
Charleston, the pattern of competition and consensus illustrates a
contested and contentious balance between the 'interested' propertied
whites the marginalized parts of the community.
"During the Fortnight past," reported The South Carolina and
American General Gazette, "several Proposals have been m ade...for

stopping the Im portation of Goods. ..till the Revenue Acts shall be
Repealed" with "many" already signing "Resolutions for that
Purpose."41 Even as merchants and mechanics exchanged bitter

41 The South Carolina and American General Gazette, July 4, 1769; The South Carolina Gazette and
Country Journal, July 15,1769.
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accusations - readers learned of several "proposals" underway "for
One General" agreement.42 Ever fearful of chaos and disorder, a drive
tow ard consensus quickly emerged in Charleston. The individuals
who joined non-importation efforts in Charleston genuinely believed
in their community's ability to force Parliament to repeal the
Townshend Revenue Acts through protest, and so the central question
became deciding upon the most effective, orderly form for that protest.
The drive for consensus stemmed from a common fear that
mechanics, merchants, and planters shared about the potential actions
of colonial others - sailors and slaves - residing in Charleston. In the
period of negotiations, mechanics and the planters held "the whip
hand" as members of the first association increasingly refused to "lay
out their money" with merchants participating in the second
association. As lists revealed that a num ber of merchants belonged to
both boycott associations, while others supported the position of the
mechanics and planters, compromise appeared inevitable by mid-July.
Overtures for a combined agreement by merchants fearing more
extreme actions resulted in a joint committee to draft a uniform
agreement distilling the essentials of the two rival agreements.43

42 The South Carolina and American General Gazette. July 17, 1769.
43 S el lers. Charleston B usiness on the Eve of Revolution. 20 8,219.
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On July 22,1769, serving as president of the public meeting
Christopher Gadsden twice read aloud a new compromised plan,
pausing paragraph by paragraph to field objections from those
gathered. By acclaim, the crowd of planters, mechanics, and
merchants voted "unanimously" to support a third non-importation
agreement which, reported The South Carolina and American General
Gazette "we have no reason to doubt will be satisfactory to. ..every

Freeman in the Province."44 The agreement combined the first and
second non-importation associations, ultimately granting greater
allowances for the merchant and planter economic interests, while
expanding the power of the mechanics.
Unraveling how protest resumed within Charleston requires
reconstructing this community: tracing the relationships, competition,
collusion, and ultimate drive for consensus among the 'interested'
classes who drafted, joined, and participated in non-importation
schemes shaped by fears of potential unrest among these colonial
others. The conflict over protest that emerged on June 15 as mechanics
drafted a non-importation association in direct opposition to the
merchants' inaction, developed into a brief period with two competing
organizations, and ultimately ended with an agreement palatable to
the merchant and planter interests: an agreement that endowed
44 Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 49.
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mechanics for the first time with equal political power in the
association, an extra-legal power they w ould continue to exercise
throughout the Revolution.
The rapid transition of Charleston over the summer of 1769
raises fundam ental questions about what participating in these
associations meant to contemporary people. In all accounts newspapers, correspondence, pamphlets, and journals - this period
appears a real crisis within a community "famous for our Harmony."
In this exceptional moment w hen different opinions, interests, and
ideas about protest circulated and divided the community, what can
we learn about how individuals understood their place within the
Empire, their persuasive power, and the dynamics of their particular
community? What self-interest and ideologies drive action? As we
examine these "interested7classes, w hat can we unravel about their
world and their experience? W hat can we ascertain about those
marginalized in this form of protest? How are the interested classes
pressed into particular actions by the excluded others? In a moment of
conflict and consensus, answers to these fundam ental questions about
the contemporary experiences of protest challenge us to recreate this
soon-to-be-Revolutionary world, reexamining common notions about
the origins of American independence.
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In hindsight, the renewal of non-importation in response to
Townshend Revenue Acts appears a direct trajectory from the protests
of the Stamp Act Crisis inexorably pushing towards the Revolution.
But for Charleston residents in the summer of 1769, the adoption of
non-importation felt like a wholly distinct moment - one informed by
English radical tradition and the community's past experiences - but
hardly the torch of an irrepressible revolution severing ties with
England. So persuaded were those who signed non-importation
association of their importance within the British empire, that they
truly believed in their own power to change imperial policy through
(an often quite limited form of) protest.
This essay examines the origins of the contentious resum ption
of protest in the Charleston during the summer of 1769 to unpack the
interests, loyalties, perceptions, fears, and hopes driving the initial
inaction, aggressive articulation, direct competition, and ultimate
consensus in protesting the Townshend Revenue Acts. Beyond simply
restoring contingency in the protests prior to the American Revolution,
by examining this contested moment of protest w ithin Charleston, it is
possible to reconstruct how contemporaries conceived of their
moment, their rights, their position, and even themselves w ithin the
British Empire. While this experience of Charleston does not apply
everywhere, it certainly begs us to reconsider and reexamine the
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experience of contemporaries within each port community from Rhode
Island to Antigua.
The economic interests and ideological divides between the
merchant, planter, and mechanic interest before the Townshend
Revenue Acts, deeply influenced the variety of responses to the
legislation and ultimately shaped w hat individuals believed they were
participating in during the resum ption of non-importation. Far from
building a communal trust and common understanding suggested by
historian T.H. Breen, non-importation in Charleston originated and
thrived in a contentious, competitive environment.45 Before even
connecting to other colonies, capturing how the community itself
interacted, points to how protest operated within the British Empire 46
*

*

*

A Note on Sources The Charleston Press, Public Opinion, and the Townshend Crisis
A small note appeared on June 1,1769, informing readers of the
South Carolina Gazette that "in O rder...to make for the FRESH

INTELLIGENCE" the editor Peter Timothy has "taken the Liberty to

45 T.H. Breen. The Marketplace of Revolution: How Consumer Politics Shaped American Independence. N ew
York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
46 In reading the contemporary newspapers and letters, it seems nearly impossible to conclude
that participating in non-importation built trust or developed common understandings. From the
origins to the enforcement, each individual in Charleston believed they signed on, participated in,
violated, or resisted fundamentally different associations than others within the community. No
consensus existed within the port to build towards a common revolution in the manner that T.H.
Breen or Pauline Maier describe. Choice was part o f the equation, but coercion and marginalizing
undesirable, radical elements routinely proved more powerful to the outcome o f non
importation.
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leave o u t.. .Advertisem ents... and the whole of the Marine List."47 In
Charleston, and throughout the British Empire, colonial newspapers
provided the central source of printed news and information; during
times of crisis, the newspaper editors' importance grew exponentially.
From newspapers, colonists learned of the comings and goings of
vessels in the port, ministers in Parliament, and British armies in the
world. While many of the voices of individuals who participated in
non-importation associations rem ain lost to the historical record, the
extant colonial newspapers provide an overview of the news, opinions,
and political changes which colonists received, read, learned, and
filtered into their larger understanding of their place in the empire and
potential to influence Parliament.
Recent work on the colonial press reveals that - unlike the
limited distribution of pamphlets - newspapers circulated widely,
often passing through multiple hands in roadside taverns and public
houses.48 In his work on public opinion in colonial America, Richard

47 The South Carolina Gazette, June 1,1769.
48 As a point o f comparison, historians estimate that 195 pamphlets on the question o f American
independence were published in America between 1764 and mid-1776, but o f that number,
merely 16 percent were published between 1767-1772, the height o f theTownshend Revenue
crisis. Richard Merritt estimates that one newspaper existed for every sixty-five colonists, a
number he believes rises exponentially once second-hand readers are included. A few o f the
sources analyzing newspapers and public opinion in the American colonies applied to the
research for this paper include: Carol Lynn Knight. The American Cohnial Press and the Townshend
Crisis 1766 — 1770: A Study in Political Imagery. (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 2, 8-9,
Richard Lawrence Merritt, “Public Opinion in Colonial America: Content-Analyzing The
Colonial Press,” Public Opinion Quarterly 27 (Fall, 1963), 356-71; Sidney Kobre, Foundations of
American Journalism (Tallahassee: School o f Journalism, Florida State University, 1958), 81; Sidney
Kobre, Development of the Colonial Newspaper (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), 160, George E.
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M erritt argues for newspapers as the mouthpiece for the most
politically relevant stratum of the population, whose changing
attitudes and perceptions circulated through editorials and letters.
Contemporaries recognized the impact of newspapers on the
community for competing interests and individuals used newspapers
as organs to persuade, cajole, and defend their position.49 Although
news undoubtedly arrived in ports as rum ors and reports from ships,
the newspapers offer a glimpse into w hat colonists knew, when they
knew it, and how they acted upon this knowledge.50
The broadsides of the newspaper - bracketed with
advertisements for exotic goods, land for sale, and private tutors -

Cullen, Jr., “Talking to a Whirlwind: The Loyalist Printers in America, 1763-1783” (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, West Virginia University, 1979); Isaiah Thomas, History of Printing in America
(Barre, Mass: Reprint, 1970), Richard Beale Davis, Intellectual Life in the Colonial South 3 Vols.
(Knoxville: T he University o f Tennessee Press, 1978); and Douglas C. McMurtrie, A Histoy of
Printingin the United States Vol. 2, Middle and South Atlantic States (New Y ork: Burt Franklin, 1936).
Philip G. Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1787 (Chapel Hill: University o f
North Carolina Press, 1941); Arthur M. Schlesinger, St., Prelude to Indtpendence: The Newspaper War
on Britain, 1764- 1776 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958); Jim Allee Hart, The Developing VIEW S
O N TH E N E W S Editorial Syndrome, 1500- 1800 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1970);and Thomas C.Leonard, “News for aRevolution: The Expose in America, 176 8- 1773,”
Journal cf American History 67 June, 1980), 26-40.
49 Knight. The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis. 2; Richard Lawrence Merritt, “Public
Opinion in Colonial America: Content-Analyzing The Colonial Press,” Public Opinion Quarterly 27
(Fall, 1963); Sidney Kobre, Foundations ofAmerican Journalism (Tallahassee: School o f Journalism,
Florida State University, 1958), 81; Sidney Kobre, Development cf the Colonial Newspaper (Gloucester,
Mass.: Peter Smith, 1960), 160; George E. Cullen, Jr., ‘Talking to a Whirlwind: The Loyalist
Printers in America, 1763-1783” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, West Virginia University,
1979).
50 The focus for this paper on newspapers is in part a drive to get away from the
Gadsden/Laurens dichotomy o f many works, by broadening the source base. To avoid assuming
an impending revolution, as a way to recreate the world where this news was read, interpreted,
and acted upon the paper relies heavily on newspapers. We are missing several key sources that
informed the news, particularly the conversations on the docks between captains and crews
coming and going, much o f the correspondence, and also many o f the papers themselves. For the
purposes o f this paper, these newspaper serve as arbiters o f public opinion, an assumption that
overlooks many important factors shaping opinion including - to name a few - religion and
churches, as well as, personal conversations and correspondence.
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presented colonial readers with excerpts of news from abroad, lists of
vessels in and out of Charleston harbor, and various opinion letters.
The newspaper directly connected its readers with the community and
the empire cementing economic, political, and social links across the
Atlantic. This paper uses contemporary newspaper accounts to
understand the city in which Charleston residents worked, lived,
played, and protested. The world presented in Charleston's
newspapers, however, does not capture all of what occured within
Charleston. As the advertisements for runaw ay slaves and the
movement of ships reveal, a good portion of Charleston residents were
actively marginalized to the borders by those 'interested' classes, a key
factor informing and shaping the ensuing protest.
As editor, compiler, writer, and producer, the colonial
newspaper printer played a central role in shaping opinion - often
abandoning English standards of impartiality. While many colonial
printers served apprenticeships in Great Britain and maintained close
ties with their mentors, newspaperm en in the colonies tended to
position themselves as businessmen. American printers catered the
news, information, and editorials to the interests and sympathies of
readers, often while vying for the business of the colonial governments
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and assemblies as postmaster or public printer.51 Three presses - the
South Carolina Gazette, the South Carolina and American General Gazette,

and th eSouth Carolina Gazette and Country Journal - competed to inform
their readers of the current state of politics and politicians. Their
papers included possible changes in imperial plans for the American
colonies, offered a running commentary on imperial policy, as well as,
news of the efforts of Agents, merchants, and sympathetic ministers
prom oting South Carolina's interests in England.52
Peter Tiothy, printer of the

South Carolina Gazette, inherited a

reputation for impartiality from his father and, upon the father's death,
his mother who ran the press. Timothy's paper focused upon printing
all sides of an issue - generally avoiding editorial essays- and
reporting (but not commenting) on news items. The Stamp Act crisis,
however, m arked a substantial shift in the politics and policies of the
Timothy, who as public printer and postmaster, voiced a measured
opposition to the duty. The South Carolina and American General Gazette,
printed by Robert Wells, a Scotsman and principle bookseller in the
Carolinas, competed for readers with the South Carolina Gazette.
Fearful of violating the Stamp Act legislation, Timothy and Wells
issued a joint statemetiincreasing subscription prices to cover the cost
51 Buel “Freedom o f the Press,” 68-80, Knight The American Colonial Tress and the Townshend Crisis
3,4,134.
52 Knight. The American ColonialTress and the Townshend Crisis 46, 135; Maier, From Resistance to
Revolution, xx.
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of the required stamps. As the increased duty and prices proved
untenable, both papers suspended publication until the act was
repealed. As of November 1,1765 w hen the Stamp Act took effect,
Charleston suddenly possessed no published news outlet. In this
interim, Peter Timothy's brother-in-law and former apprentice,
Charles Crouch launched his own paper, The South Carolina Gazette and
Country Journal.53 Aided by members of the lower house - and with

little personally to lose - Crouch violated the Stamp Act to publish his
newspaper.54
As the Townshend Revenue Acts unfolded into crisis,
Charleston's three colonial papers - as well as the other seven
published in the South - shared a remarkable degree of uniformity in
news and opinion. Even as Robert Well's South Carolina Weekly Gazette,
and the subsequent South Carolina and American General Gazette,
provided the main stream of conservative thought and Peter Timothy's
South Carolina Gazette increasingly served as the organ for residents
53 Peter Timothy later explained to Benjamin Franklin that the suspension o f his paper had been
a major mistake, “reducing” him “ from the m ost popular.. .to the most unpopular Man in the
Province.” That his former radical readers encouraged his former apprentice and relative Charles
Crouch to launch a new paper in defiance o f the Stamp Act further angered Timothy. Crouch’s
South Carolina Gazette and CountryJoum<2/ “ imm ediately attracted a large list o f patrons,” according
to Timothy, which included Henry Laurens and John Lewis Gervais. Three years after the
suspension, Timothy estimated that he continued to lose m oney because o f his decision to
suspend publication. Jeffery A. Smith, “Impartiality and Revolutionary Ideology: Editorial
Policies o f the South Carolina Gazette, 1732- 17775,” Journal of Southern History 49, no. 4 (November
1983): 511-26; Arthur M. Schlesinger, “The Colonial Newspapers and the Stamp Act,” New
EnglandQuarterly 8 (March 1935): 63-82; Edmund and Helen Morgan, Stamp A.ct Crisis, 242;
Henry Laurens to John Lewis Gervais, January 29, 1766, LP ,5:5434- 35.
54 Knight. The ^American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis 11; Weir, “Role o f the Newspaper
Press in Southern Colonies, 107-8; Christopher Gould, “Robert Wells, Colonial Charleston
Printer,” South Carolina Historical Magazine, 79 (19 7 8), 23-49;
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p ressin g the resu m p tion o f non-im portation, the contain nearly

identical news stories from England and other colonies.55 Faced with
competition from the patriot-leaning South Carolina Gazette and Country
Journal Timothy's radical position strengthened in the period

following the suspension of printing during the Stamp Act. By the
passage of the Townshend Revenue Acts, Timothy's paper became "a
virtual anthology of anti-ministerial literature," according to historian
Jeffery Smith, often publishing the writings of John Wilkes and John
Dickinson alongside events in Boston and New York. Even in leaning
towards the patriot cause, The South Carolina Gazette's reporting and
practices (such as printing black borders to announce violations of
American rights and printing the names of violators of non
importation association), fall in line w ith the practices of papers
throughout the South.56

55 The South Carolina Gazette June 1, 22, 1769, Sellers. Charleston Business on the T v e of the A merican
Revolution, 206; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons ofUberty, 47.
56 Bythe time ofth e revolution, mostpapers had taken a decidedly patriotic position. Indeed,
only two southern papers prior to the revolution would be labeled T ory’ - the Georgia Gazette and
the South Carolina and American General Gazette. However, during the years o f the Townshend
crisis, it was not necessarily easy or even possible to tell patriot from Tory papers by looking at
the news and opinions taken from British publications or the news o f events in neighboring
colonies. The uniformity o f Southern newspapers, according to Knight, did not occur merely
from shared intellectual tradition and connections with the British press, but from die shortage o f
printers, the close ties between various printers (kinship, apprenticeship and friendship), and the
frequent reprinting o f news and letters from papers in other colonies. Knight estimates that
approximately twenty percent o f the material presented in a given colonial paper had previously
appeared in print in another paper. N o t only did newspapers reprint stories from each other, but
also from British newspapers and magazines, which were presented as accurate and balanced
view o f British opinions. Knight concludes that this uniformity at the time o f the Townshend
crisis resulted in a similar image ofBritish initiatives, American responses, and British reactions,
which might “account for the common understandings that Americans came to about issues.”
This claim is perhaps both overstating the consensus o f people reading the papers and their
commitment to particular viewpoints. Knight. The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis,
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The Stamp Act Crisis inaugurated a wider position advocacy by
printers that with the arrival of news of the Townshend Revenue Acts
became central to the resum ption of non-importation associations. As
w ith the Stamp Act, the colonial newspapers of Charleston reprinted
excerpts from pamphlets, letters from concerned citizens, news from
other colonies, as well as, word of possible repeal (and ministerial
change) in London.57 One question that emerges from reading these
papers is: how accurate a picture did the colonial newspapers paint for
their readers? And, how im portant were the news reports in shaping
colonial action? With more regular contacts abroad, the merchant
interest often cautioned against the picture of British politics portrayed
in the press, printing their private correspondence from England
which cautioned against protest, in favor of a petition campaign. In
her study of The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis, Carol

5-11; Daniel J. McDonough, Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens: The Parallel Lives of Two
American Patriots. (Sellingsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 20(30) 53; Hennig Cohen, The
South Carolina Gazette (Columbia; University o f South Carolina Press, 1953); James W. Barker,
“The Coming o f the War for Independence and the South Carolina Press: An Examination o f
Printer’s attitudes and a Content Assessment o f their Papers, 1765-1770,” (unpublished M. A
Thesis, the University o f South Carolina, 1980); J. Ralph Randolph, “The End o f Impartiality:
South Carolina Gayette, 1763- 7 5;” JournalismQuarterly, XLIX (Winter, 1972), 703-06 andJefferyA.
Smith, “Impartiality and Revolutionary Ideology: Editorial Policies o f the South-Carolina Gazette,
1732-1775,” The Journal cf Southern History, XLIX, N o. 4 (Nov., 1983), 511-26; Stephen Botein,
“Meer Mechanics’ and an Open Press: The Business and Political Strategies o f Colonial American
Printersf Perspectives in American History, IX (1975), 127-228; Stephen Botein, “Printers and the
American Revolution,” in The Press and The American Revolution, ed. By Bernard Bailyn and John B.
Hench (Worcester. American Antiquarian Society, 1980), 11-58; Richard Buel, Jr., “Freedom o f
the Press in Revolutionary America: The Evolution o f libertarianism, 1760- 1820,” in The Press
and the American Revolution, edited by Bailyn and Hench, 59-98 and Robert M. Weir, “The Role o f
the Newspaper Press in the Southern Colonies on the E ve o f the Revolution: An Interpretation,”
in The Press and the American Revolution, edited by Bailyn and Hench, 99-150.
57 Knight. The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis, 4-6,
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Knight finds gross misrepresentation of British opinion in the press,
often exaggerating both the size and power of the pro-American
faction and the tolerance for colonial disobedience, key factors in the
arguments supporting renewed non-importation during the
Townshend Revenue Act crisis.58
Alongside many in England, Ireland, and the British colonies,
Charleston residents perceived a wider plot against freedom and
liberty afoot.59 This paper builds upon the scholarship Pauline Maier
and neo-Whig historians, but also moves beyond "portents of
revolution" to examine how a community understood their position,
without overshadowing their historical moment.60 The Charleston
residents who participated in non-importation each entered into
associations with their own distinct ideas of economic self-interest and
ideology, participated in protest with fellow associators possessing
diametrically opposite views, and, w hen they violated the associations,
illustrated the wide variety of opinions which fell under the umbrella
of non-importation. As there was no direct trajectory to protest in
Charleston, there was certainly no direct trajectory from protest to
revolution. As a historian, then, understanding protest requires
58 Thomas G. Tanselle. “Some Statistics o n American Printing, 1764-1783,” in The Press and the
American Revolution, ed. Bailyn and Hence, 354.
59 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, xii —xviii.
60 Maier, From Red stance to Revolution, xviii, x-xi,xx, 114; Pauline Maier, “The Charleston Mob and
the Evolution o f Popular Politics in Revolutionary South Carolina, 1675-1784,” Perspectives in
American History, IV (1970), 171- 96; Edward Countryman A People in Revolution,
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analyzing how contemporaries in a community understood their
moment: w hat were the inputs driving for protest, w hat were the
dynamics pressing for consensus, and how did the experience of
protest match expectations of what they believed they were
participating in by signing non-importation agreements. In the
following pages, this paper explores these three questions, beginning
with an examination of the ideological, political, and economic
contexts for the 1769 renewal of non-importation and then traces the
contentious resum ption of non-importation during the summer of
1769.
*

*

*

Chapter 1: Charleston's Perceptions of Position within the Empire—
The Economic and Ideological Contexts for the Townshend Crisis

From the goods that filled their homes to the news that filled
conversations, colonial Charleston residents consciously and proudly
defined themselves as British. Hardly a core or periphery, in their
economic, political, and social lives Charleston's planters, mechanics,
and merchants felt a vital part of the British Empire. By the summer of
1769, these feelings of strong attachment and power within the
economic empire coexisted alongside genuine fears of being
marginalized by political machinations in London. The resumption of
non-importation emerged from a web of inputs: including, the
community's (often heightened) perception of importance within a
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global empire, their confidence in the power to persuade English
politicians, and their sense that they participated in a larger British
political conversation. The resum ption of protest in Charleston affirms
that in the British Empire, not all politics was local.61
Perceptions of Power in the Empire The Merchant Community of Charleston

Situated at the convergence of the Ashley and Cooper Rivers the meeting point between product (deerskins, rice, indigo, and cotton)
and market (Europe and the West Indies) - the port of Charleston
oversaw upw ards of ninety percent of the colony's imports and
exports throughout the eighteenth century. The city's physical growth
occurred alongside its commercial development, so that from 1720 to
the American Revolution, Charleston's population quadrupled to
become the fourth largest town in colonial America.62 Far from a
single endeavor or narrowly defined interest, the pursuit of economic
gain in any possible form defined the multifarious activities of

61 As Russell Menard argues, the roots o f South Carolina’s revolutionary movement grew from
the fertile economics o f the port, which “made some citizens aggressive and self-confident, filled
them with pride in their achievements, persuaded them that they could manage their own affairs”
and “made them resent British interference.” Russell R. Menard, “Economic and Social
Development o f the South,” in The Cambridge Economic Elistory of the United States, vol. 1, The
Colonial Era, ed. Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman. (Cambirdge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), 249-95; Mercantini, Who Shall Rule at Home? 18-19.
62 The professional local merchant community grew with the exportation o f rice. The majority o f
merchants were British, but a number o f Eluguenot migrants and traders from the West Indies.
U.S. Bureau o f the Census, Historical Statistics o f the United States: Colonial Times to 1970,2
vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), 2:1161, 1164; R.C. Nash, The
Organisation cfTrade andFinance in the A. tlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670-1775 ined.
Peter A. Coclanis (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 200 5), 77; Peter A. Coclanis.
Shadow of aDream: Economic Fife and Death in the South CarolinaEow Country 1670 —1920. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 114.
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Charleston's business community. This ethic of aggressive economic
self-interest thrived in the business climate of the British Empire in the
period preceding 1763, when minimal government interference or
enforcement enabled Charleston merchants to effectively centralize
control of the trade for their surrounding region.63
The export trade in rice - and later indigo - out of Charleston
fell under the control of a specialized merchant community who
oversaw a sophisticated mortgage exchange spanning the Atlantic
World. Carolina's economy relied upon a near constant flow of credit
directed by these colonial m erchants who acted as agents or
representatives for British firms. Commission merchants or merchant
factors (the term used in this paper, as the most common in sources)

served the role of importer, exporter, broker, and banker: selling
merchandise sent to him by his British firm, purchasing goods for his
British correspondents, arranging shipments, and lending money
locally for the purchase of land, slaves, and all manner of goods.
Exports to the West Indies and Southern Europe, as well as to Great

63 For imperial purposes, the “Charleston District7’ comprised o f South Carolina, swaths o f
North Carolina, Georgia, and after 1763 East and West Florida. The trade from each o f these
regions flowed primarily through Charleston, and many factors and planters from South Carolina
developed the products and farms in the surrounding colonies (particularly Georgia). Sellers,
CharlestonBuisness on the Eve ofFeuolution. x, 4, 8, 31; Nash, The Organisation cf Trade and Finance in the
Atlantic Exonomy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670—1775, 96-7.
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Britain, largely occurred on these British rather than South Carolinian
account books.64
Merchant factors - the key leaders of the merchant interest in
the colonial era - epitomized Charleston's position as a cosmopolitan
port. In an era w hen personal contacts enabled the global flow of
credit key to the cash-crop economy, an individual factor's wealth,
family connections, and friendships powered Charleston's economy.65

64 A few books and articles on the economic development o f Charleston informing this paper:
Leila Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of the American Revolution, George C. Rogers, Charleston in
the Age of the Pickneys. (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1980); Stuart O. Stumpf,
“The Merchants o f Colonial Charleston, 1680 —1756” (Ph.D. diss., State University o f Michigan,
1971); Peter A. Coclanis. “The Hydra Head o f Merchant Capital: Markets and Merchants in Eady
South Carolina,” in The Meaning ofSouth Carolina History: Essays in Honor of George C. Rogers, Jr. ed.
David R. Chesnutt and Clyde N . Wilson (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Pres, 1991), 118; R.C.Nash, “Urbanization in the Colonial South: Charieston, South Carolina, as a Case
Study,” Journal of Urban Histoiy 19 (1992): 3- 29; eds. Jack P. Greene, Rosemary Brana-Shute and
Randy J. Sparks. Money, Trade, and Power: The Evolution of Colonial South Carolina’s Plantation Society.
(Colum bia:TheUniversityofSouthCarolina Press, 2001); Russell R. Menard,“Economic and
Social Development o f the South,” in The Cambridge Economic History of the United States, vol. I, The
Colonial Era, ed. Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman. (Cambirdge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996), 249-95.
65 In an overview o f Charleston factors, it appears the chief requirements were a combination o f
personal capital and an apprenticeship as a clerk with an English or Carolina merchant firm. The
capital was critical for purchasing merchandise (most notably slaves), providing warehouses
goods, purchasing partnerships in ships, as well as extending loans. Wealthy and powerful
families sought positions for their sons in the merchant houses, which meant that planters’ sons
frequently became merchants. This practice further blurs clear lines o f merchant or planter class.
The training began as a merchant’s clerk, when aspiring factors learned the basics o f shipping and
supplying credit through the tedious work o f invoices, backcountry travel and overseeing
shipping. Clerkships often required young men to travel to the frontier o f the province, to
plantations, to the West Indies, Southern Europe, and Great Britain, as a way “to establish a
correspondence with the merchants trading to Carolina & obtain a share o f their commissions.”
In an economy that necessitated personal trust, this period proved key to cementing future
business. Future factor John Hopton, for example, toured over 500 miles o f the frontier country
to gain trading partners, followed by foreign travels during his five-year clerkship with Henry
Laurens. This preparation, Laurens wrote, would allow Hopton to begin “commercial life upon
as good footing as any man he had known in Carolina.” In the transition from clerkship into
business, Hopton received the assistance o f two established Charleston factors, Laurens and
Gabriel Manigault who invested together in a cargo o f rice, sending with Hopton a
recommendation letter “to give him an introduction into trade and assist him in making West
Indian correspondents,” and guaranteeing any loans. Much like Charleston society, this business
arrangement relied personal connections in a way almost unimaginable today. Laurens’
correspondence in regards to Horton can be found: Laurens to Mayne & co. Aug. 1 ,1770; to
Cowles & Co., Feb. 18,1771; to R. Grubb, March 6, 1771; to Bright & Co., Jan. 12, 1770; a good
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With no thought to a separation between colony and metropole,
individuals born in Great Britain traded in Charleston and Charleston
natives traded in London. With regular contacts in Liverpool, London,
Oxford, Bristol, Cowes, Poole, Glasgow, Jamaica, Barbados, New
Providence, Tortola, St. Christopher, St. Kitts, Antigua, St. Augustine,
Oporto, Lisbon, Madrid, Havana, Guadeloupe, Boston, New York,
Philadelphia, and Rotterdam, Charleston factor Henry Laurens, for
example, possessed a network of trading partners eager for a part of
the lucrative rice and indigo trade. For some factors, like Samuel
W ragg and Scott James Crokatt, trading and living in Charleston
proved but a brief sojourn before establishing firms in London.66
British firms not only traded in Charleston, but London merchants also
served as agents representing the colony, actively petitioning
Parliament and ministers on behalf of Charleston's merchant interest.
Through personal contacts throughout the Atlantic basin, Charleston's

overview o f this process is in: Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of Revolution, 49 - 51; Nash, The
Organisation of Trade andEinance in the Atlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670-1775, 95.
66 Trade connects were so numerous that, at the end o f the Revolutionary War, five London
firms founded byChadeston expatriates claimed sixty-three percent o f the prerevolutionary debt
owed from South Carolina to London merchants. In this continuing theme o f the importance o f
personal connections, Wragg’s position in London was replaced byjam es Crokatt who in the
1720s and 30s, had been one o f Charleston’s key merchants before moving to London in 1737,
where he acted as South Carolina’s agent. Factor John Beswicke followed a similar path,
migrating to Charleston from London around 1734, to return to London in 1747 a major trader,
operating a firm only second to Crokatt’s. While personal experience in the colony certainly
helped business, a number o f London merchants traded exclusively with Charleston interests but
had never lived or visited. These merchants often possessed, however, close family and business
ties with those w ho had migrated, and remained in regular communication. One example, John
Nutt, a leading London merchant, married James Crokatt’s daughter and worked with his
brother, Joseph, w ho represented his firm’s business interests in South Carolina. N ash, The
Organisation cf Trade andEinance in the Atlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670-1775, 92-5.
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powerful merchants kept their fingers on the pulse of the Empire.
Hardly some parent-child m etaphor - a myriad of real personal,
financial, and political connections spanned the Atlantic intimately
connecting port city to imperial capital.
As part of orchestrating export shipping and delivery, the
Charleston factor also served as wholesale importers competing
directly with a growing number of independent merchants in the
port.67 Between 1732 to 1737, seventy-four traders advertised the sale
of dry and miscellaneous goods in Charleston, importing from Britain
an average of £ 84,000 per year. Thirty years later, the number of
advertisers reached 130 with imports increasing to over £ 271,000 per
annum. These independent merchants - often referred to as Country
factors - grew in num ber throughout the late colonial period, operating

retail stores in Charleston and placing direct orders for their planter
clientele.68 The profusion of local merchants, left "our place...saturated
with every Article of Merchandize by Merchants who im port.. .upon
their Accounts," complained factor Henry Laurens to a Bristol
correspondent, so that "there is very seldom an O pportunity of
making even a saving Sale of Goods."69 Im ported goods inundated

67 Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of Revolution, 50, 53.
68 Nash, The Organisation of Trade and Finance in the A.tlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 16701775,82-83.
69 As Henry Laurens wrote to a Bristol merchant in October 1768; Sellers, Charleston Business on the
Eve cf Revolution, 50, 53.
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Charleston's market, as independent importers expanded their
business through credit from British firms. This rapid growth of a
second type of merchant created a major fault line within the merchant
interest.
Country factors - like their planter customers - hoped for high
prices for rice, low freight weights, and continual extensions of credit.
As the orchestrators of shipping exports abroad, merchant factors,
conversely, profited from the combination of low rice prices and high
freight rates. Each of the two sides - that representing rice grower
(country factor) and rice purchaser (merchant factor) - competed to
create a profitable business climate. This jockeying for profits, by
limiting the amount of rice in Charleston, flooding the market during a
full harbor, and spreading disinformation, pitted the country factors
and planters against the merchant factors.70 This divide between
merchants w ith antithetical business interests emerged alongside a
period of changing imperial regulation, substantially undergirding the
tensions, perceptions, and responses to Parliamentary legislation.
Confidence and the Currency Crisis Conflicting Perceptions of Charleston's Place within the Empire

From its beginnings as a disease-ridden hinterland, a quest for
maximum profit and participation in global trade m otivated South

70 Nash, The Organisation ofTrade and Finance in the Atlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 16701775,80.
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Carolina's planters and merchants. Through various bounties,
Parliament and the Assembly of South Carolina prom oted marketoriented crops including: indigo, flax, hemp, tobacco, silk, wine,
lumber, naval stores, olive oil, barley, wheat, cotton, and ginger.71
Eager to exploit these opportunities, Charleston's early entrepreneurs
combined planting w ith trade, establishing a pattern that continued
throughout the colonial era. The success of rice laid the foundation for
Charleston's heightened perception of its own importance within the
British Empire. With a rising slave population in the West Indies,
South Carolina's planters and merchants exported the cheap foodstuffs
that fueled the lucrative sugar industry. With naturally overlapping
and intertwining interests, South Carolina's merchants and planters
allied together for maximum gain, enjoying enormous profits even as
northern ports suffered economic depression.72
For Charleston residents, rice exports not only rebuilt the city in
fine English style but, more importantly, cemented their elite status
within the Empire. In response to petitions from colonial agents and
London firms, Carolina rice traders won a rare exception to the
Navigation Acts in 1730, enabling their ships to travel directly into
regions south of Cape Finisterre without first passing through British

71 P.R.S.C .XXXII, 31; Sellers, Charleston Buisness on the Eve of Revolution. 31.
72 Hardy, “Colonial South Carolina’s Rice Industry and the Atlantic Economy,” in eds. Greene.
Money, Trade, and Power: The Evolution of Colonial South Carolina’s Plantation Society, 117.
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ports. Not only did this exception radically increase profits for the
planters, merchants, and investors in Carolina's rice, it bolstered a
feeling of importance for the port. Charleston business - it seemed to
those most closely involved - was so crucial to the Empire as to merit
enumeration, advancement, and protection from the highest levels of
British government.73 In the decades following the 1730 exception,
Charleston residents possessed ample justification to look around the
Atlantic World and feel like a central, powerful player in the web of
empire.
Throughout the 1740s and 1750s, investment in the fast-growing
plantation economy of South Carolina proved lucrative business; in
England, investments returned at most five percent, while investments
in South Carolina commonly resulted in an eight to twelve percent
gain.74 Eager investors lent money to planters and merchant houses
created complex systems of indirect investments in the form of
mortgages on slaves and land. The Charleston merchant factor not
only provided the link between investor and investment, but also often
directly invested in land, slaves, and plantations himself.75 The
cheapness of land, the possibility of reward, and the initial cost of

73 Hardy, “Colonial South Carolina’s Rice Industry and the Atlantic Economy,” in eds. Greene.
Money, Trade, and Power: The Evolution of Colonial South Carolina’s Plantation Society, 115-7; Nash, The
Organisation of Trade andEinance in the Atlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670— 1775, 87.
74 Nash, The Organisation ofTrade and Finance in the Atlantic Economy'.Britain and South Carolina, 1670
- 1775, 95; Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of Revolution, 53, 55, 74-75.
75 Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of Revolution, 57-59.
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investment prom pted innumerate co-partnerships between merchants
and planters to form, dissolve, and reappear. Such diversification in
agricultural product, as historian R.C. Nash points out, "was not a
symptom of entrepreneurial backwardness," but a "rational
investment" in a highly profitable global commodity. The availability
of short and long-term credit became increasingly im portant
throughout the colonial period, and left Charleston planters and
merchants heavily in debt to London merchants.76
In the period following the Seven Years War, colonial planters
and merchants discovered English capital progressively more difficult
to access. A change appeared underway, challenging Charleston's
self-perception as a co-equal player in the British Empire. As flow of
easy credit and ready investment slowed, the fundamental pattern of
colonial business shifted. The passage of both the Restraining Act and
Currency Act in 1764 dealt Charleston a further blow by forbidding the
emission of legal tender currency without the permission of Parliament
and effectively preventing the use of paper bills of credit as legal
tender, a common practice w ithin the port city.77

76 Nash, The Organisation of Trade and Finance in the Atlantic Economy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670
- 1775; 90, 97.
*
77 Parliament gravely threatened colonial financial structures by passing in September 1764 “an
act to prevent the issue o f paper bills o f credit in any o f the colonies and to prohibit the legal
tender o f such bills, as were then subsisting, from being prolonged beyond the periods for calling
in and sinking them ” Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 41; Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of
Revolution, 68, 72; 4th George III, Cap. X X X IV ; McDonough, Christopher Gadsden andHenry
Laurens, 64.
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The 'currency question' dominated discussions within the port
as paper money became increasingly scarce, a reality that particularly
dogged artisans, small merchants, and planters who often found
themselves w ithout recourse when repaying debts to merchant
factors.78 Planters chafed under the operation of the law, finding
themselves without sufficient funds to pay past debts - often unable to
buy goods and services from mechanics or merchants. Similarly as
fewer and fewer employers could pay wages, mechanics increasingly
resorted to bartering. The Charleston court docket filled with cases of
debts, and the newspapers advertised daily demands to settle
accounts.79 Tensions between the merchant, mechanic, and planter
interest groups rose, with num erous societies forming to demand
relief.
Parliamentary acts to raise revenue (e.g. Sugar, Stamp and
Townshend Revenue Acts) threatened to further remove legal tender
from the colony.80 W hen combined with strict customs enforcement
and the news from other colonies - Jack Green and Richard Jellison
78 McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry L^aurens. 68-9.
79 Records o f the Court o f Common Pleas, 1767. Miscellaneous Court Records, 1770-1771, Book
D D , MS, typewritten copies, South Caroliniana Library; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons ofEiberty, 41-42
80 The Sugar Act, as it was usually called, did not prohibit the exportation o f provisions and
lumber (the chief American exports) to the French West Indies. It did place such a high duty on
the importation o f foreign sugars that this vital trade became almost useless for American who
wanted to accumulate credits so that they could buy British manufactured goods. Squeezed
between rising prices for imports and the falling prices o f exports, Americans trading with the
West Indies were outraged at a tax that cut further into their profits. In N ew York, John Watts
commented crisply and darkly, “the weak must go to the wall.” Alan Rogers, Empire and Elberty:
American Resistance to British Authority, 1755-1763. (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1974),
125; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Eiberty, 33.
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have argued - the currency crisis served as a reminder to the colonists
that despite their trading position, they remained subordinate to the
desires of the imperial government.81 Fearful contemporaries
m easured the effect of Parliamentary actions by Charleston's most
visible bottom line: the harbor, for as one Charleston resident
estimated, "soon" ships would be "out of employ: And their burthen
together...reckoned 3,500 tons."82 In their petition opposing the Stamp
Act, the South Carolina Commons House of Assembly expressed great
concern that the "state of the paper currency in use in the province"
had dipped dangerously low w ith merely £106,500 in currency (equal
to £15,214 sterling) circulating. The colonial government urged their
agent Charles Garth to "use your utm ost endeavors to procure for this
province liberty to emit paper currency to the amount of £40,000
sterling," a request that was repeatedly denied.83 The announcement of

81 Henry Laurens to Cowles and Harford, May 5, 1764, TjP, 4:264-65; Knight. The American
Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis. 45; Jack Greene and Richard M. Jellison, “Currency Act o f
1764 in Imperial-Colonial Relations, 1764- 1776,” William an dMaiy Quarterly ,3 rd Ser. Vol. 18
(Oct., 1961), 490.
82 Expressions o f anxiety by American merchants cannot be dismissed as simply reactions to a
temporary post-war slump. In fact, economic difficulties in the 1760s were caused by
fundamental structural changes in the Atlantic economy that had been accelerated by the Seven
Years War. Specifically, during the war British firms had extended their business operations so
widely that by 1763 they were bypassing established American importers andretailers. Together
with the effort by British merchants to reduce the American share o f trans-Atlantic shipping, the
postwar depression can be seen as a direct challenge to American economic sovereignty. Rogers,
Empire andUbertj, 127; Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve ofPevolution, 63; The South Carolina
Gazette, June 27, 1768.
83 While the Currency Act o f 1764 was largely ignored in the year o f its passage for the Stamp
Act, by 1769, it was causing major problems within the colonies. The Currency crisis was made
worse by the raising o f taxes within South Carolina and Chadeston during the same period.
Between 1750s and 1770s, the population o f Charleston nearly doubled, an increase accompanied
by an increase in the numbers o f poor. Requests for relief from churchwardens o f St Philip’s
rose thirty percent, while taxes increased almost 700 percent between 1751 —1773. P.R.S.C.
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"novel" taxation schemes in "these times of necessity" as Henry
Laurens wrote, "w hen money is scarcer than ever" caused legitimate
panic in Charleston.84
Government and South Carolina:
Imperial Dimensions of Local Politics

Grumblings about the state of colonial currency filled the ornate
lobby of the new State House. Since the assum ption of royal
government in the colony to the present disruptions, the South
Carolina Commons House of Assembly had developed into the
dom inant force in colonial governance. Modeled on the English ideal,
the South Carolina government included a democratically elected
lower house, a crown appointed executive, and a 12-member Council
or Upper House.85 In theory, each part worked harmoniously to
govern the colony, but in reality, a "bitter, persistent strife"

XXXI, 278 —27 9; Sellers Charleston Business on the Eve ofRevolution, 72; Henry Laurens To
Reynolds Getly & Co. CP, Sept. 20, 1770; McDonough. Christopher G adsden and Henry Laurens. 64;
Committee o f Correspondence to Charles Garth, September 4, 1764, as quoted in R.W. Gibbes,
Documentary History of the American Revolution (New York: D . Appleton and Company, 1855), 1:2-3;
Knight. The American Colonial Press and the Toumshend Crisis. 45.
84 Example o f taxation: the tax Act o f 1760 required payment o f3 5 shillings oneach slave, 17
shillings 6 pence per centum on the value o f town lots, wharves, and buildings. They were also
assessed 17 shillings 6 pence per hundred pounds on every note bearing interest “over and above
what they pay interest for,” 5% on all annuities, and 17 shillings 6 pence per hundred pounds on
the profits o f all the professions. Reductions in subsequent tax acts were negligible so that during
the years between 1760 and 176 5 Carolinians paidmore in taxes than ever before. Walsh.
Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 33-34.
85 On elite domination o f Carolina’s government, o f the 156 merchants elected to the South
Carolina House o f Representatives, approximately ninety percent owned plantations. O f the self
described “merchant-planters” elected to the House, 81 percent were merchants before
becoming planters, while only eleven percent began as planters. This information was compiled
from Water B. Edgar and N . Louise Bailey’s directory o f the South Carolina House o f
Representatives, which shows that o f 156 merchants elected from 1692 - 1775, at least 119
(nearly 90 percent) owned plantations, in Nash, The Organisation of Trade and Finance in the Atlantic
Fconomy: Britain and South Carolina, 1670 — 1775, 95.
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characterized the colonial government. South Carolina's political
history brims with instances of interest group politics dominating the
Assembly's proceedings and long standing conflicts between the
Assembly and royal governors regularly breaking into open conflict.86
The design provided the Assembly with a central voice in local
governance, but empowered the royal governor as the sole
representative of South Carolina to British imperial authorities. The
imperial crisis of the 1760s derived much of its shape and rhetoric from
this contested political history.
The Commons House of Assembly tipped the precarious
balance of powers between local governance and imperial policy in
their favor during the period of relatively lax oversight from 1722 to
1748. As the Board of Trade remained aloof from local governance, the
Assembly largely ignored the royal governors and treated royal
instructions as recommendations rather than imperatives.87 When

86 In A Schoolfor Politics: Commercial lobbying and Political Culture in Early South Carolina, Rebecca
Starr argues that merchants rather than planters dominated South Carolina’s political culture
(by holding more leadership positions and leading the majority o f the day-to-day business o f
governing, because o f residence in Charleston). She argues that interest group politics became
the norm, and tended to encourage/demand consensus and internal conflict resolution,
essentially accounting for Charleston’s famous “harmony.” Starr argues, counter to Jonathan
Mercantini (presses for South Carolinians as surprisingly aggressive in their determination for
independence), that South Carolinians were reluctant revolutionaries. Their debate overlooks
contest to focus on this question o f consensus, and both accounts appear more interested in
uncovering the roots o f South Carolina’s role in the antebellum era in colonial political
development. This trend to locate the origins o f the nullification crisis and secession in the
Revolutionary era reappears throughout numerous, otherwise balanced works, often skewing
towards a teleological argument. Rebecca Starr, A Schoolfor Politics: Commercial Lobbying and Political
Culture in Early South Carolina. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Mercantini,
Who Should Rule at Home? 4, 6,18.
87 Mercantini, Who Should Rule at Home? 5-10.
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local interests conflicted with London's legal prerogatives, royal
officials in South Carolina found implementation impossible.88
Colonial representatives defended their local authority as fundamental
to their "rights as Englishmen," establishing a pattern that would
reappear at any sign of controversy.
Throughout the colonial period, the Commons House dom inated by Charleston's elite merchants and planters - proved
enormously successful in exercising control over finances, and thereby
influencing executive appointments and affairs. Even when, after a
protracted struggle, the royal governor finally gained a perm anent
salary, the Assembly retained the ultimate trum p card. In moments of
conflict, the Assembly could refuse to pass tax bills, effectively leaving
the government without operating funds - a move which inevitably
w rung concessions from the governor.89
From a series of conflicts over Indian, military, election, and
backcountry affairs, the Commons House of Assembly in Charleston
w on and exercised powers beyond those of the Hose of Commons in

88 There was nothing novel about the manner o f resistance; the courts, the lower houses o f
representatives, crowds protesting in the streets, were - by 1765 - familiar parts o f American
politics Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 5-6; Rogers, Empire and Liberty, 128.
89 The struggle between the assemblies and royal governors for control o f the southern colonies
is well explained by Jack P. Greene in The Questfor Power: The Lower Houses ofAssembly in the
Southern Royal Colonies, 1689- 1776 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina press, 1963). Green
has also provided the authoritative account o f the Gadsden election controversy in his article,
‘T h e Gadsden Election Controversy and the Revolutionary Movement in South Carolina,”
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 46, no. 3 (December 1959): 469-92; McDonough, Gadsden and
Laurens, 47
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England. Attempts at imperial regulation following the Seven Years
War, met a Commons House in Charleston that refused to divest its
powerful control on South Carolina's politics.90 By 1763, as historian
John Mercantini illustrates, the rights of local control over elections,
finances, representation, taxation and Indian affairs which South
Carolinians claimed as their English birthrights, "diverged in
im portant ways from traditional English rights."91
Despite their dominance w ithin the colony's government, the
formal structures of empire favored the royal governor as the "King's
man" in South Carolina. While the Commons House retained an agent
to lobby in Parliament and powerful Charleston merchants and
planters maintained num erous connections in London, the governor
possessed direct access to policy makers. After the Seven Years War,
w hen Parliament sought to rationalize the empire and bolster home
authority, an election controversy involving Christopher Gadsden and
royal governor Thomas Boone resulted in the dissolution of the
legislature - who had withheld Boone's salary and resolved to pass no
law until he formally apologized. The contest ended when Boone left
90 The issues underlying and the justifications for protest built upon older frameworks. Tensions
with GovernorThom as Boone reached a climax when, in 1762, the governor refused to allow
Christopher Gadsden to take his seat in the South Carolina assembly. The Cherokee and Seven
Years’War gave rise to older problems - ranging from quartering troops, impressment, to raising
o f revenue - that coupled with the development o f the lower house o f assembly as the center o f
political power exacerbated post-war efforts at imperial regulation. Mercantini, Who Should Rule at
Home? 10; Roger s, Empire and Liberty, 128-9; McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens,
11- 1 2 .

91 Mercantini, Who Should Rule at Home? 10.
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the colony in 1764, but served only to heighten tensions and spread
fears of a plot against liberty at a critical juncture in local and imperial
politics.92
Participation in an Atlantic Political ConversationImperial Regularization and Charleston's Reaction

The attem pts to regularize the British Empire following the
Seven Year's War, met an elite in Charleston who were convinced from
nearly four decades experience of their centrality within the trading
empire, who believed that they exemplified British ideals, and who
were convinced that they could and did influence policy at the highest
levels. That Charleston's interested parties understood their position
this way powerfully shaped their reactions to the Stamp Act Crisis.
Newspapers reported stories of political contests in Charleston using
the same radical Whig ideology applied to contests in England (i.e. the
on-going John Wilkes saga) cementing a sense in the port that even in
the smallest - most seemingly picayune - disputes, Charleston
residents participated in a wider conversation defending traditional
British rights.
Decades of political contest within the colony left Charleston's
governing planter and merchant elite with a clear sense of their
prerogatives within the empire, but importantly their power to

92 Mercantini, Who Should Rule at Home? 22.
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persuade both their community and imperial ministers, often through
m easured resistance. Protest, ultimately derives from a belief in one's
power to persuade others to act. This belief served as the backdrop for
the announcement of the Stamp Act in Charleston.
Facing an unprecedented national debt and increased costs of
defense in America imperial policymakers felt the expense of
maintaining an empire should necessarily fall upon South Carolina
and fellow American colonies.93 Predicting resistance, policymakers in
London searched for suitable m ethods to raise revenue, ultimately
settling upon extending the stamp duty to America. Since the reign of
Charles II, stamp duties (which placed taxes of varying amounts on
such items as legal documents, newspaper advertisements, and
playing cards) had been commonplace in England as an effective and
inexpensive tax to collect.94
As the Stamp Act awaited Parliamentary action, the South
Carolina Commons House of Assembly again voiced their opposition
through their colonial agent Charles Garth. The measure, wrote the
93 With the annual cost o f the army estimated at nearly £220,000, Prime Minister Grenville
believed it reasonable that America should assume part o f the expense. Previously, Grenville had
rejected relying upon the traditional methods o f requisition —demanding revenue from the
colonial assemblies, or the customs service —as inadequate. It was estimated at the time that the
British debt per person was eighteen pounds in 1763, whereas America it was only 18 shillings.
McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens. 62
94 P.D.G. Thomas, British Politics and the Stamp A d Crisis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 32;
John C. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1943),
208-10.; Edmund S. Morgan and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp A d Crisis: Prologue to Revolution
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1953), 36; McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens.
62; Thomas C. Barrow, Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial America, 1660- 1775
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 102-4.
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leading opponent in the Commons House Christopher Gadsden,
subverted "that inherent right of every British subject, not to be taxed
but by his own consent, or that of his representative."95 Reporting the
latest developments in London, Charles Garth informed the Assembly
that Parliament w ould tolerate no such arguments about the
legitimacy of such a tax, nor any claims to the colony's inability to pay
hard currency.
Colonial agent Charles Garth further encouraged South
Carolina's governing elite to appreciate the precedent established by
the Stamp Act: that in the future, Parliament would consult with the
colonies prior to the passage of any revenue legislation affecting
America. Within the context of a currency crisis, the Commons House
of Assembly simply could not perceive this as a victory; the actions of
Parliament appeared - if not an outright conspiracy - a clear sign of
declension from the exalted position Charleston held within the
Imperial order. Although the physical stamps never arrived in
Charleston, their mere existence challenged the fundamental
assumptions held by Charleston's interested classes about to their

95 Charles Garth consistently counseled the assembly and citizens in Charleston that it would be
wise to follow the Stamp Act, given that it established the constitutional precedent requiring that
Parliament consult the colonies prior to the passage of the revenue legislation. Morgan, The Stamp
A ct Crisis, 76-82; McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens. 63; Thomas, British Politics,
72- 76.
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place within the empire, their rights as Englishmen, and their power to
persuade Parliament.
The Stamp Act Crisis - Whig Ideology
A most unusual sight appeared on an early Saturday morning

in the fall of 1765 in the center of Charleston. At the intersection of
Broad and Church streets, a gallows rose "seventy feet high" with "an
effigy, designed to present a distributor of paper" hanging between "a
figure of a the devil on right hand, and on left a Boot, with a head
stuck upon it." Throughout the day, Charleston residents filed by and
gathered around, but - according to the South Carolina Gazette - no one
dared "to disturb" this scene with the slogan "LIBERTY and no
STAMP-ACT" conspicuously scrawled upon it. As the sun set, two
thousand Charleston residents watched as the "figures were taken
down, and received" funeral-style "in a cart or wagon, draw n by eight
or ten horses" which processed dow n "Broad-Street to the Bay...up
Tradd Street, halting at the door of a house belonging to George Saxby,
Esq; (the distributor of stamps)." While "great prudence" restrained
"so great a number" from leveling the home, inevitable "injuries to the
windows" occurred, not "owing. ..to any personal dislike of Saxby, but
their detestation of the office."96

96 The South Carolina Gazette, October 19, 31, 1765.
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A drive for action in Charleston quickened in the weeks
preceding the symbolic display of October 18, 1765. Since the first
announcement of the Act, a "frightful Dream" settled over the port
city. Uncertain how to respond, reactions ranged from suggestions in
The South Carolina Gazette that local stamp officers should resign their

commissions, to fears expressed by royal officials that "giddy minded"
and "evil disposed persons" could incite uncontrollable riot among
slaves and sailors.97 As Charleston residents made sense of these novel
developments in imperial policy, anything seemed possible. For
contemporaries, reaction to the Stamp Act Crisis occurred at the
intersection of economic self-interest and political ideology. The
taxation from Parliament challenged bottom lines, as well as colonists'
conceptions of their rights as Englishmen. In Charleston this
combination proved a combustible mixture.
The measures in the Stamp Act affected the pocketbook of
nearly every inhabitant in South Carolina with the heaviest burden
falling upon townsm en in Charleston. Planters, lawyers, and
merchants faced a substantial rise in daily expenses as stamps were
now required on basic deeds, legal documents, and marriage
certificates, as well as, the documentation for every ship clearing the

97 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 53. The South Carolina Gazette, September 28, 1765.
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port (including the river vessels, which had long skirted customs
enforcement). The cost to mechanics securing labor rose precipitously,
for the price of a stamp on negotiating agreements with apprentices
alone cost seven pounds, which constituted more than half the weekly
earning of most masters. In public taverns and private homes,
discussion of the Stamp Act met with "hearty damns" and reports of
action underw ay in other ports to prevent the enforcement of the tax.98
Beyond their account books, the colonist's also faced crisis of
political identity w ithin the Empire by the imposition of this taxation
without representation. As the colonial assemblies conflicted with
royal governors and the presses published political news from the
British Isles, colonial thinking about political rights were heavily
influenced - as Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and Pauline Maier have
illustrated - by the writings of English revolutionaries John Milton,
Algernon Sidney, John Locke, Robert Molesworth, Benjamin Hoadly,
John Trenchard, and Thomas Gordon, Francis Hutchenson, and
Catherine Macauley. By the advent of the Stamp Act Crisis, South
Carolina's political elites and newspaper editors sympathized with this

98 Richard Walsh illustrates how the mechanics secured labor. Master mechanics faced a tax on
indentures costing 2 shillings 6 pence, and a further stamp for negotiating agreements with
apprentices cosdng 7 pounds (accounting for more than half o f an average weekly earnings,
which ranged between 30 and 45 shillings per day, and at most, 10.6 to 13.10 pounds per week
Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 35.
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"Real Whig" or "Commonwealthman" tradition, and increasingly
understood political developments through this lens.99
News stories from both shores of the Atlantic - from the tales of
John Wilkes to the various encroachments on freedom in Boston were filtered through this Whig ideology into a larger sense of a
conspiracy against liberty and of widespread abuse of power by
ministers in London. W hat in retrospect appear as be separate
struggles between local colonial assemblies and governors or an
individual parliam entarian and the Crown, amassed in the m inds of
many in South Carolina into a full-scale, systematic attack on British
liberty. The English form of government - which Charleston colonials
believed to be the greatest in the world - was created by the people to
promote the public weal. W hen those empowered violated the public
trust, they forfeited their powers back to the people, who were then
obligated to reconstitute that political authority.100
The protection of liberty and of the rights of Englishmen against
tyranny necessitated constant vigilance by citizens, so that at the first
abuse of power action could be taken. Since Whig political theory
stressed that if tyranny "is suffered once, it will be apt to be repeated

99 This broader Anglo-American political tradition shaped colonist’s attitudes toward civil
uprisings. Colonists thought o f themselves as part o f the Atlantic conversation, and applied
Whig ideas about public authority and popular political responsibilities to local issues. Maier,
From Resistance to Revolution, 27.
100 Maier, From Fed stance to Revolution, 27-8.
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often; [and] a few repetitions create a habit/' It was, then, incumbent
upon Charleston residents to definitively resist the Stamp Act, lest this
"habit claim proscriptions and right."101 With the conception of
themselves as im portant players in the British Empire, Charleston
residents felt part of a larger struggle defending the British form of
government. Daily newspapers confirmed this sense by keeping
residents abreast of all the agitation and arguments in the Wilkes
dispute and the happenings in other Northern colonies.
The conversation from the piers and streets that continued into
the taverns and State House, paralleled discussions occurring
throughout the American colonies of the British Empire. On July 19,
1765, the Commons House of Assembly received the Circular Letter
from Massachusetts calling for a meeting in New York to discuss a
unified response to the Stamp Act. After some discussion, the
Assembly voted to send Christopher Gadsden, Thomas Lynch (a
wealth rice planter) and John Rutledge (a 26 year-old lawyer) to the
extra-legal congress, specifically opting not to record the vote in the
journal of the Commons House.102 Rejecting the advice of their colonial
agent in London, the Commons Assembly also appointed a committee
led byGadsden to prepare a reply to Parliament.
101 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 43.
102 Walter J. Fraser, Jr. Patriots, Pistols, and Petticoats: ‘Poor Sinful CharlesToum during the A. merican
Revolution.” {Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1993), 34; McDonough. Christopher
Gadsden and Henry Laurens. 65; Ramsay, Histoy of South Carolina, 2:253.
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The South Carolinians denounced the legislation as both
unconstitutional and, due to the currency shortage, untenable. The
petition highlighted their ideological opposition stating, "The first, and
in our opinion, the principle reason, against such a measure, is its
inconsistency with that inherent right of every British subject, not to be
taxed but by his own consent, or that of his representative." The
Commons House urged repeal, expressing to Parliament its hopes that
"when that august body comes to consider this m atter they will view it
in a more favorable light, and not deprive us of our birthright, and
thereby reduce us to the condition of vassals and tributaries."103 Any
loss of the traditional rights of Englishmen brought a terrible specter to
light for the colonists: the possibility that Americans were not
Englishmen, or as Christopher Gadsden asked, "in order to retain
those.. .natural liberties of British subjects.. .a m an must never stir out
of Britain, where they are indisputably and essential his....[for] the
m oment he sets foot on American ground, he has bid farewell to the
dearest of them?" Colonists, argued Gadsden, had emigrated with the

belief that their fundamental rights were transplanted, for "no free

103 As quoted in R.W. Gibbes, Documentary Histoy of the American 'Revolution (New York: D.
Appleton and Company, 1855), 1:2-3; McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens. 63;
Committee o f Corresonpdence to Charles Garth, September 4, 1764.
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men, on such conditions, would have ever thought of coming to
America."104
As the date for the first stamp duties November 1,1765 drew
near, the petitioning campaign to Parliament - a first response to
offensive legislation - appeared inadequate. For many in Charleston
and ports to the North, it became increasingly clear that Parliament
w ould not remove the offensive legislation without greater resistance
Since the "constitutional method" of redress had failed, argued one
letter in The South Carolina Gazette, resistance was necessary to
circumvent the "prospect of future slavery."105 In Charleston, the
message of radical Whig rhetoric received particular support from a
ground swelling of opposition in mechanic's organizations like the
Fellowship Society and the Charleston Fire Company.106
Action Unfolds - The Stamp Act Crisis on the Streets of Charleston

The gallows scene of October 19,1765 vividly exhibiting the
threat posed by the stamps contained an additional warning - those
who "shall dare attem pt to pull down these effigies, had better been

104Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 36.
105 The South Carolina Gazette, June 2,
106 Resistance to the Stamp Act; as illustrated by historian Richard Walsh, cemented an alliance
between Gadsden and die mechanics which did not simply constitute a mob following a
demagogue. Charles Gadsden appreciated the usefulness o f mechanics “whose worth no man in
the city, perhaps is better acquainted with than myself.” Looking back after the Revolution,
Gadsden reflected that “From the first off, and throughout the revolution, none have shewn
themselves more firm and stead in the m ost dangerous and trying occasions.. .had it not been for
their assitance, w e should have made a very port figure indeed.’Walsh, Charleston’s Sons cfUberty,
35, 39; McDonough, Gadsden and Laurens, 68.
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born with a mill stone about his neck, and cast into the sea/'107 As carts
drew the grim figures dow n Broad Street toward the piers, the crowd
swelled to over two thousand people who halted on Tradd Street
before the house of George Saxby, the distributor of the stamps. When
yells from the mob met silence, stones broke windows. Leaders of the
procession struggled to prevent members of the crowd from leveling
the home. Royal officials watched, utterly powerless.
As tensions heightened, the door was opened and a search
revealed that Saxby and his family possessed none of the rum ored
stamps. Accompanied by a funeral dirge emanating from St. Michael's
muffled steeple bells, the mob continued to a field where the effigies
were burned and a coffin inscribed with "American Liberty" dutifully
buried. Many in the crowd, still excited from the earlier processional,
left the funeral for the taverns to drink "Damnations to the Stamp
Act." As the mob converged that night to dissemble the display, form a
parade, raid homes for stamps, and drink symbolic toasts - a new
more frightening vision appeared for Charleston's propertied whites:
the real possibility of total, uncontrollable chaos in the streets.108
While Peter Timothy in The South Carolina Gazette insisted that
the only reported damage - a few broken w indow s- could have been

107 The South Carolina Gazette, October 31, 1765.
108 P.R.S.C., XXX: 281-283,279-280; The South Carolina Gazette, October 31, 1765.
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avoided if the hom e's inhabitants had answered sooner, for many
wealthy merchants and planters the gallows scene raised a far more
frightening specter than a few stamped papers.109 For Charleston
residents, like their English counterparts, the presence of disgruntled
crowds hardly suggested some novel development. Popular uprisings
regularly occurred in reaction to impressments, to punish criminals, or
to protest abuses of power by public officials. Annually, Charleston's
interested classes watched celebrations of Pope's Day degenerated into
brawls and debauchery.110 The demographics of the port's slave
majority and white minority, however, predisposed merchants and
planters towards limiting the size, strength, and recurrence of mobs.
Underlying all this action in the streets lay the widespread
belief - derived from radical Whig thought - that w hen approved
channels of redress for grievances proved inadequate or w hen officials
abused their office, immediate action must occur to protect the rights
of the citizens. Popular turbulence, as historian Paulina Maier
describes, flowed "so naturally from inadequacies of government that
riots and rebellions were often described with similes from the

109 The South Carolina Gazette, October 31, 1765; McDonough. Christopher G adsden and Henry
Laurens. 68-9.
110 Maier. From Resistance to Revolution, 4,12; George Rude, The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular
Disturbances in France and England, 1730 -1848. (New York Wiley, 1964).
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physical w orld."111 Participants in the action on the streets of
Charleston deemed their protest to be necessary. In their view,
Parliament not only threatened English liberty but by repeatedly
ignored petitions from the colony for redress violated a sacred trust.
Members of the Charleston mob, then, possessed the right - indeed,
they believed, the duty - to act outside of the bounds of law, as an
extra-institutional check on the real abuse of power.
To be considered legitimate, the mob's actions needed to target
the specific grievance (either physically or symbolically), receive the
broad support of the community, and control any signs of disorder.112
In Charleston, a constant tension between order and disorder defined
much of the debate about mob action.113 As the ranks of protesting
crowds swelled with sailors and slave-owners feared the actions of
their property, Charleston's elite knew that weak law enforcement left
them unprotected should the majority of the population suddenly

111 Members o f the British House o f Lords could acknowledge and argue that “rioting is an
essential part o f our constitution,” and even Massachusetts Governor Thomas Hutchinson, who
lost his home to a mob, claimed that “M obs, a sort o f them at least, are constitutional.” The key
was retraining these mobs, and channeling the energies to productive or symbolic, not destructive
purposes. Maiet, From Resistance to Revolution, 22 ,2 9 .
112 In his study o f the crowd in France and England at this time, George Rude concludes that
“m obs” proved “remarkably single-minded and discriminating” in their targets, which were
chosen in relation to the grievance. George Rude, The Crowd in History.
113 Throughout this period, South Carolina’s agent Charles Garth continually warned the
Assembly (which was reprinted in the newspaper) that news o f violence and disorder from the
colonies would not be well received in London. Garth and many merchants believed that reports
o f mobs only hurt a petitioning campaign for repeal. Charles Garth to Committee o f
Correspondence December 23,1765, LP, 5:47-48.
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riot.114 Once lit, the tinderbox of socio-economic relationships in
Charleston threatened to explode. This fear was confirmed when, only
nights after the gallows scene, a mob disguised in "soot, sailors habits,
and slouch hats" arrived at the door of several prom inent officials
again searching for stamps.115
On the night of October 23,1765, merchant factor Henry
Laurens awakened to the sounds of a crowd gathering outside his
home.116 Believing stamps to be hidden within the mansion, a mob
amassed shouting " Liberty, Liberty & Stamp'd Paper, Open your doors &
let us Search your House SzCellars

In his correspondence, Laurens

described the scene: a mob of sixty to eighty men banging on the door,
threatening the "worse consequences" to his home and person, while
his pregnant wife begged him to allow a search of their home. Upon
opening the door "a brace of Cutlasses" met his chest, and Laurens

114 On violence and Whig thought: Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 13, 17, 39, 57.
115 Henry Laurens tojosep h Brown, October 11,1765, L P ,5:25.
116 Henry Laurens had previously voiced opposition to the Stamp Act, but did not support the
actions on the street. Laurens, like many fellow merchants, urged fellow citizens to obey the
Stamp Act until repeal occurred through lawful means. He expressed real concern that the
violence in Boston would not “be feebly imitated by some turbulent spirits in this Metropolis.”
H e wrote to a friend in the days before his house was raided that, “Conclude not hence that I am
an advocate for the Stamp Tax. No, by no means. I would give, I would do, a great deal to
procure a repeal o f Law which imposes it upon us, but I am sure that nothing but a regular,
decent, becoming representation o f the inexpediency & inutility o f the Law will have the desir’d
effect & that all irregular seditious practices will have an evil tendency, even perhaps to
perpetuate that & bring upon us other Acts o f Parliament big with greater mischiefs. Resignations
which people here build so much upon can answer no good end. The Act must be executed &
indeed a suspension o f it while it is in force would prove our ruin and destruction... In short
there remains nothing for us at present to do but to shew a graceful obedience to the Law until
we can procure in a constitutional way or to beat to Arms & I defy all the grumbletonians from
Quebeck to West Rorida to point out a medium.” Henry Laurens to Joseph Brown, Oct 11,
1765,LP, 5:25.
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began trying to identify the leaders and members of the mob,
addressing several of them by name. This failed to have any calming
effect - for according to Laurens - the mob replied that they "Loved &
respected me" and "would not hurt me or my property but that they
were sent by some of my seemingly best friends to search for the
Stam p'd Paper which they were certain was in my custody." A "very
superficial search or no search at all" quickly took place and upon
finding no stamps, the mob dem anded Laurens swear an oath that he
did not know the location of the stamps. Laurens outright refused,
reiterating his opposition to the Stamp Act and state he "had
voluntarily given my work & honour but w ould not suffer even that to
pass my Lips by compulsion." The mob praised him and raised three
huzzahs, before dissolving into the streets. After an hour of tense
excitement, Laurens wrote of his amazement that the mob "did not do
one penny damage to my Garden not even to walk over a Bed & not 15
pounds damage to my Fence, Gate, or House."117
The m idnight assaults upon the homes of Henry Laurens and
Chief Justice Charles Shinner prom pted wide speculation and debate
about the nature of the Charleston mob and its legitimacy. The chief
117 Henry Lauren’s wife, Eleanor, gave birth to a son, James Laurens on November 26, who one
o f Lauren’s close friends refered to as “George L ib ert/’ after the exploits o f this night.
Henry Laurens to Joseph Brown, October 22, 28 1 765,LP, 5:27; Henry Laurens tojam es Grant
(the royal governor o f East Florida), November 1,1765, January 29, 1766, LP, 5:55;McDonough,
Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens, 70; David D. Wallace The Life of Henry Laurens (New York,
1915), 119.
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questions became who constitutes the mob, and w ho's leading the
mob. From the very first moments that the crowd surrounded his
home, Laurens recognized "the Cloven foot of a certain malicious
Villian," who incited the mob "from behind the Curtain who could be
reached only by suspicion." Away in New York City at the Stamp Act
Congress, Gadsden's name circulated as a "rash, ringleader of people"
inciting "burglary and robbery" under the guise of constitutional
principles.118
Since the mob formed in response rumors, Henry Laurens
located the immediate source of his discontent with Peter Timothy
who in his paper the South Carolina Gazette, "put your name into the
M ouths of those Anti-Parliamentarians" making him the "sole
projector as well as prom pter of the [entire] Play."119 In a report to the
Board of Trade, Lieutenant Governor Bull reiterated suspicions that
Peter Timothy's paper the South Cnolina Gazette served as the "conduit
pipe" for "busy spirits" to poison the colony with falsehoods "imbibed

118 While Gadsden did not send the m ob to Lauren’s home, he never denounced its actions. In a
letter written following his return to Charleston, Gadsden praised the crowd saying “ Our people
have behaved as firmly in the common cause as any upon the Continent, without having don the
least mischief, and I make little doubt o f their continuing so to do, though we have a number o f
cunning, Jacobi tical, Butean rascals...” Christopher Gadsden to William Samuel Johnson and
Charles Garth, December 2, 1765.
119 While Timothy’s participation in Sons o f Libertyis clear,his leadership is questionable. He
may have exaggerated, for example, when he informed Benjamin Franklin that the “Opposition
to Tyranny was raised by a single inconsiderable Man here,” referring to himself, “under all the
Discouragements imaginable, even Gadsden doubting whether it could be attempted.” Peter
Timothy to Benjamin Franklin, June 12, 1777, ed. Douglas C. McMurtrie, Letters of Peter Timothy,
Printer of Charleston, South Carolina, to Benjamin Franklin, Chicago: Black Cat Press, 1935), 17- 18;
Henry Laurens to Joseph Brown, October 28, 1765, LP, 5:30; Henry Laurens to James Grant,
Novem ber 1, 1765, LP, 5:36.
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& propagated from Boston & Rhode Island."120 To those opposed to
the mob, a handful of firebrands - not the 'interested' community's
consensus - accounted for the actions of the mob. Challenging the
basis of the m ob- as mere rabble roused by a few firebrands - also
challenged the legitimacy of their actions and causes.
In response to the gathering crowds and potential unrest,
Lieutenant Governor Bull (acting as top royal official in South
Carolina, in the absence of the royal governor), announced the
following morning that all stamps had been deposited at Fort Johnson,
guarded by soldiers to ensure peace.121 Alongside this announcement,
each crown-appointed stamp official in Charleston publicly resigned
their offices, asking on behalf of "his Majesty's colonies" the "repeal of
an act that has created so much confusion."122 With the Stamp Act
collection slated to begin November 1, it became clear that execution
w ould be impossible. As Charleston residents began to calculate the
effect of resistance upon their city (the closing of the courts, the port,

120 In lieutenant Governor Bull’s own words, “Some very extraordinary and universal
commotions in the town” had occurred, prompted “by the artifices o f some busy spirits” who
“universally poisoned” the “minds o f men. ..with the principles which were imbibed &
propagated from Boston & Rhode Island.” This response was quite typical, to blame outside
agitation on ideas arriving on ships from the port, or as Laurens’ did, on certain individuals.
William Bull to Board o f Trade, Novem ber 3, 1765, PRO, v. 30, reel 10; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of
Liberty, 36-7.
121 The South Carolina and American General Gazette, October 31,1765; William Bull to Board o f
Trade, Novem ber 3,1765, PRO, reel 10, vol. 30.
122 The South Carolina Gazette, October 31, 1765; McCrady, Royal Government, 571-2. P.R.S.C. XXX.
281-283,279-280.
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the newspapers), the mechanic interest pushed the community
tow ards sustained resistance.
With rum ors circulating about plans for a Christmastime slave
insurrection, the press for peace within the port met the wide support
of Charleston's propertied merchants, planters, and wealthier
mechanics. For many, the specter of anarchy prom pted the
consideration of new form of protest - one that ensured order while
channeling potential disorder, one that privileged propertied white
involvement while marginalizing sailors and slaves, and one that
ensured profits while bringing a swift repeal - the answer came in the
form of a non-importation association.123
Charleston's First Foray into Non-Importation

With no stamps, the civil court and port of Charleston officially
closed on November 1,1765. The Commons House of Assembly
approved the resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress, sending yet
another series of petitions through their colonial agent in London.

123 In a city with a slave majority, controlling the violent action o f mobs was the single most
important goal o f South Carolina’s interested groups. Individuals were quite fearful that an
uncontrolled mob would set alight other dissatisfied groups, particularly slaves. While some, like
Henry Laurens believed the slave plot was nothing more than slave w ho “mimick’d their betters
by crying out L.ibertyf Lieutenant Governor Bull acted quickly to prevent possible rebellion
among the slaves. The fear o f revolt also calmed some o f the radical elements m ost ardent
champions, including Gadsden, who expressed concern over mob action by April 1766, a fact
with Henry Laurens noted to his correspondents with unrestrained glee. Henry Laurens to John
Lewis Gervais, January 29, 1766, LP, 5:52-53; William Bull to Board o f Trade, December 17,
1765; Documents Illustrative of Slave Trade, 4:415; Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt Urban Life in
America, 1743—1776 (New York Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), 313; Pauline Maier, “The Charleston
Mob and the Evolution o f Popular Politics in Revolutionary South Carolina, 1765-1784,”
Perspectives in American History, 4 (1970): 173- 96; Christopher Gadsden to William Samuel Johnson
and Charles Garth, December 2,1765, WCG, 44.
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Colonial leaders from northern and southern ports crafted a common
strategy of non-importation: an "ordered resistance" designed to
channel potential unrest into a peaceful, limited form of protest.124
Having exhausted "constitutional method[s]," Charleston residents
"who had trusted to their representatives [in Parliament]" became
"terrified at the prospect of future slavery" and signed onto non
im portation association. Ideally, this combination served to ensure a
broad consensus among the propertied interest, while limiting the
possibility of chaos.125
By the winter of 1765-1766, import trade reached a standstill.
On wharves and streets throughout the port city, business adjusted to
the new realities of non-importation. W ithout stamps, civil courts
suspended business, indentured servants ran out their contracts, and
Charleston's two newspapers lasted only a few weeks before stopping
their presses.126 Barrels of rice cluttered the wharves and
approximately fourteen-hundred unemployed sailors crowded the
taverns.127 Tensions abounded in the port, particularly between the

124 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 76.
125 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 36, 64, 75.
126 Timothy later regretted this decision, as mentioned earlier in footnote 53. Jeffery A. Smith,
“Impartiality and Revolutionary Ideology: Editorial Policies o f the South Carolina Gazette, 173217775,” journal of Southern History 49, no. 4 (November 1983): 511-26; Arthur M. Schlesinger,
“The Colonial Newspapers and the Stamp A ct,” New England Quarterly 8 (Marchl935): 63-82;
Edmund and Helen Morgan, Stamp A ct Crisis, 242; Henry Laurens to John Lewis Gervais, January
29, 1766, L P , 5:5434- 35.
127 To keep this growing number o f seamen in line, the leaders o f the prote st movement (in
concert with the actions o f Lieutenant Governor Bull, w ho reported that the sailors in larger
number “grew licentious”) suppressed any sailors deemed unruly and frequently tossed supposed
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planter-merchant interest groups and the mechanics. Radical
mechanics and the Liberty Boys found themselves forced to agree on
an elongated list of goods in order to gain the support of Charleston's
merchant and planter interest. And even though Christopher Gadsden
prowled "the w ater side a night to see if anything [was] moving
among the shipping" only limited efforts at enforcement occurred.128
Tensions w ithin the non-importation movement heightened as
Gadsden publicly accused the merchants of using the specter of slave
insurrection and sailor tum ult to "poison the minds of the people" in
order to gain greater exceptions to an already weak scheme of
protest.129 On the whole, the merchant and planters held the whip
hand in Charleston, even forcing Lieutenant Governor Bull to permit
ships to clear port under certain conditions that spring.130 At public
meetings and in Charles Crouch's new paper, each interest group
exchanged bitter accusations, and the delicate consensus appeared
liable to dissolve at any moment. Across the Atlantic, however, the

ringleaders into jail. McDonough, Christopher Gadsden and Henry Laurens, 73; Gov. William Bull to
Conway, Charleston, February 6,1766, PRO Co 5.390, ff. 66-7. Maier, From Resistance to Revolution,
71.
128 The South Carolina Gazette, February 25,1766; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of IJberiy, 39.
129 Fraser. Patriots, Pistols, and Petticoats, 36.
130 Radical elements tried to force the courts to open without stamped documents and the
complete opening o f the port. Lieutenant Governor Bull allowed some degree o f violation, by
allowing ships to leave for Florida, the Bermudas, and N ew Providence. H e was motivated by
fears that the British there would suffer famine and servile insurrection if Charleston’s commerce
was halted. Eventually, aware o f possible outbreaks o f violence in Chadeston, he allowed
clearance to all ships whose captains paid a sum equivalent to the charges required by the Stamp
Act. P.R.S.C, XXX, 277-278, XXXI, 22 -251 Drayton, Memoirs, 89-91; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of
JJbert)i, 39.
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American boycott stimulated lobbying activities of the commercial and
manufacturing interests who applied pressure to Parliament. Suddenly
- right at the moment w hen non-importation faced tough questions in
Charleston -new s arrived of the "repeal [of] the dreadful Sentence."131
Repeal and Reprieve - Celebration in the Streets

On June 9,1766, the first "REVIVED" issue of the South Carolina
Gazette published news which had already reached every dock, alley,

warehouse, tavern, inn, home, nook and cranny in Charleston:
Parliament had repealed of the Stamp Act. Although rum ors of repeal
circulated for months, definitive news of the March repeal by
Parliament arrived in the port in early May. Upon hearing the news,
Christopher Gadsden "was so overcom e.. .that he almost fainted."
Spontaneous celebrations broke out around the town, for "all was Joy,
Jollity, and Mirth," wrote Speaker of the Assembly Peter Manigault.
The white Charleston residents "intoxicated with joy" planned a day
of celebration for "our happy deliverance form the apprehensions of
oppression and slavery" to correspond with King George's June 6th
birthday.132
The m orning began w ith a joyful ringing of St. Michael's bells
and proud displays of British colors. Along the harbor, boats strung

131 Christopher Gadsden to Captain Burden, February 20,1766, Dartmouth Papers D
1778/2/169.
132 The South Carolina Gazette, June 9, 1766.
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their colorful signal flags from mast to mast. From the fort, cannon
shots fired in celebration. Throughout the streets, banners hung from
townhouse windows. Royal officials and Sons of Liberty radicals alike
celebrated Parliament's decision to repeal the Stamp Act. A parade of
the colony's militia including Christopher Gadsden's artillery
company processed for review by Lieutenant Governor Bull, the
Council, the Assembly, and assorted public officials. Following the
public displays, Lieutenant Governor Bull hosted a gathering at
Dillon's Tavern providing "very elegant entertainment." At the dinner,
"many loyal and constitutional toasts were drunk amongst which the
best friends to Britain and America were not omitted." The celebration
ended with a "grand and general" fireworks illuminating the
harbor.133
Throughout the joyful occasion, Charleston's residents
exchanged good cheer and spirits in even measure all around. To
thank the King for his "great goodness," the Commons House of
Assembly prepared an address and forwarded resolutions in his honor
to demonstrate that "the inhabitants of this province [remain] a loyal
and a grateful people." Alongside their praise for the King, the
Assembly voted to erect a marble statue in honor of William Pitt for his

133 McDonough. Christopher Gadsden and Henty l^aurens, 76-77; The South Carolina Gazette June 9,
1766.
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"noble and generous assistance toward obtaining the repeal,"
including such memorable lines from speeches as, "Americans are the
sons not the bastards" of England.134 The statue - the first of a public
m an in America - erected on July 5 in the center of town, at the
intersections of Broad and Meeting Street celebrated in stone this great
moment of repeal, an achievement accomplished by South Carolinians
and their allies.
In the euphoria of the moment, the Stamp Act repeal cemented
among Charleston's merchants, planters, and mechanics their
continued importance within the British Empire and their persuasive
power w ithin the halls of Parliament. W hen faced with the abuse of
power, Charleston non-importers had successfully crafted a legitimate
and peaceful protest in the model of their Whig ideals.135 Due to the
timing of the repeal, Charleston's port residents avoided many of the
tough questions dem anded by protest that w ould resurface during the
Townshend Revenue Crisis.136 In their minds at this moment -

134 Throughout the colonies, William Pitt was viewed as the star o f the repeal effort for his lines
like, “I rejoice that America has resisted” and “Americans are the sons not the bastards” of
England. His speeches were frequently reprinted and cited as indicative o f support for non
importation and protest. Merchants in Charleston were offering a coin with Pitt’s profile on the
side. Letters o f thanks to Pitt and perceived allies in England appeared in Charleston’s papers.
Knight, The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis. 32, 71; The South Carolina Gazette March
30, April 20,1767; The South Carolina Gazette and Country Journal April 29, May 13, 1766.
135 Maier, From Resistance to Evolution, 74.
136 Particularly, questions about enforcement, leadership, and participation.
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Charleston non-importation association members had formed a
persuasive argum ent for repeal, sacrificed to protest injustice, and
ultimately convinced Parliament of their legitimacy.
Enthusiastically celebrating their trium ph in protecting the
rights of Englishmen, Charleston's celebrating throngs - like those in
other ports - largely ignored the ominous wording of the Declaratory
Act passed alongside the Stamp Act repeal. The majority of colonists
felt that the British government supported their interpretation of the
constitutional question, a belief reinforced by colonial news outlets. In
her survey of Southern newspapers, historian Carol Knight, found that
the news appearing from London and British cities focused primarily
on three optimistic stories, including: the double repeal of the Stamp
Act and English Cider Act, the m inistry's future plans for increasing
trade in the American colonies, and the likelihood of a change in
ministers which would benefit the colonies.137 These rum ors of
positive change in the wake of non-importation bolstered Charleston

137 Among news items being published alongside the repeal celebrations, included rumors and
speculations o f new plans which the Rockingham ministry were forming for America (not
necessarily bad news), plans o f creation o f a duty-free port in Dominica (a real boon for
Charleston business), and potential changes in currency policy to aid the cash-poor colonies.
These rumors o f changes in imperial policy were read alongside descriptions o f individuals in
England who had lobbied and acted on behalf o f the American colonies, including royal
governors, manufacturing towns in the England, and merchant houses. In toto, southeners
received a fairly rosey picture o f future imperial policies, even as disturbances from northern
colonies began to filter into papers. Knight, The American Colonial Press and the Tonmshend Crisis. 22,
24, 27, 29, 32, 46- 49; The South Carolina and American G eneral Galette Augus 1 1, 1766.
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residents' perceptions of the power of their actions.138 Through action,
colonists believed they had influenced policymakers during the Stamp
Act Crisis in particular directions, establishing a precedent and
encouraging future protest.139
While most colonials "Thank[ed] God" that South Carolina
became "now again, the land of liberty," Christopher Gadsden and
fellow radicals organized a somber meeting beneath the Liberty Tree.
Standing before a high-spirited bunch of Charleston's mechanics,
G adsden- one participant recalled after - "harangued them at
considerable length." In pure "folly" Charleston's residents "relax[ed]
their opposition and vigilance...indulging the fallacious hope that
Great Britain w ould relinquish her designs and pretensions." Before
the crowd, he read the preamble of the Declaratory Act, "pressing
upon them the folly of rejoicing at a law" which "asserted and
maintained the absolute dominion of Great Britain" over the colonies.
Couching his argum ent in radical Whig rhetoric, Gadsden outlined
"all the chances of succeeding in a struggle to break the fetters...
imposed on them," to which mechanics joined hands and "swore their
defense against tyranny."140

138 Knight, The American Colonial Press and the Townsbend Crisis. 25; Maier, From Resistance to
Revolution, 107; The South Carolina Gazette, June 16,1766.
139 McDonough, Christopher Gadsden and Henry Taurens, 77; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 41.
140 Gibbes, Documentary History, 1764-1776, pp. 10-11; Johnson, Traditions andReminenscences, 28-29;
Burton, South Carolina Silversmiths, IT, Walsh, Charleston’s Sons of Liberty 40; Knight, The American
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Beyond the Liberty Tree's reaches, other colonial residents also
noted that the once celebrated victory remained incomplete. As details
of the Stamp Act repeal filtered in, skeptical observers cautioned their
fellow colonists that the 240 to 133 victory of repeal in Parliament
represented a comfortable, but hardly secure majority. That the
Declaratory Act passed in rapid succession to the vote further
challenged Charleston merchants' and planters' perceptions of their
power within the Empire.141 Many felt, like Henry Laurens, that
despite new statues and shared toasts, "all America will undergo
many pangs yet before there is a hearty reconciliation."142
Repeal of the Stamp Act did not solve the issues dividing
Anglo-America.143 As we know in hindsight, colonial opposition in
Charleston reawakened in 1769 in response to the Townshend
Revenue Act of 1767. Those carefully reading the news or
corresponding with London merchants noted that - not only did
London policymakers disapprove of American actions during the
Stamp Act Crisis - a growing number argued that the petulant non
importers deserved to be punished, tamed, and rem inded of the
Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis. 24; South Carolina and American General Gazette June 6,1766;
The South Carolina Gazette and Country journal June 17, 1766.
141 Charles Garth to Committee o f Correspondence, February 25, 1766, LP, 5:128-9.
142 Henry Laurens to John Lewis Gervais, May 12,1766, LP, 5:129-30; Henry Laurens to John
Lewis Gervais, September 1, 1766,LP, 5:184.
143 An essay printed on April 15, 1768, The South Carolina andAmerican General Gazette voiced many
o f these tensions and fears. Paraphrasing Barre, the author reiterated that Parliament was no
longer treating America as its children, warning that i f Britain became a tyranny, America would
not willingly become her slaves. The South Carolina and American Genera I Gazette, April 15,1768.
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authority of Parliament. Many in England described how "alarming"
the "disturbances from North America" were "to those Gentlemen
who have large sums due them there." Letters from London often
expressed a measured support for the American position during the
crisis with the persistent caveat: "except for the acts of violence".144 No
one within the port or w ithin the colony, however, saw in this m oment
foresaw revolution.145
The intervening years between the euphoric summer of repeal
in 1766 and the contentious summer of dissent in 1769, further
challenged Charleston's interested classes' perceptions of their place in
the empire, their powers of persuasion in London, and their
understanding of the dynamics w ithin their own community. The
Townshend Revenue Act Crisis in Charleston developed, as describe
above, from divergent and contentious trajectories from individual's
economic and ideological experiences in the years following the Stamp
Act Crisis.
Charleston entered the period of imperial regulation as a
peripheral community convinced of its own centrality. For planters,
merchants, and mechanics this belief came increasingly under assault

144 The South Carolina Gazette, June 16, 1766; The South Carolina and American General Gazette, August
8,1766; Knight. The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis 1766 - 1770,3 1 .
145 Maier, From Resistance to Evolution, xviii, x-xi,xx, 114; Pauline Maier, “The Charleston Mob and
the Evolution o f Popular Politics in Revolutionary South Carolina, 1675-1784.”
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by renewed enforcement of customs,146 a critical currency shortage,147 a
rash of bankruptcies,148 as well as, news from northern colonies.
Throughout the colony, mechanics and planters suffered the harsh
economic realities of economic downturn. W ithin the city, wealthy
merchants recalled the street scenes during the Stamp Act Crisis,
remaining deeply concerned - even paranoid - about a "contagion of
liberty" spreading among the black majority and itinerate sailors. The
quick formation and power of mobs rem inded Charleston's power
structure of its tenuous position. Despite their apparent success in the
Stamp Act Crisis, individuals within the port city carefully calculated

146 On customs enforcement: In the spring o f 1767, a new royal customs collector arrived in
Charleston. Daniel Moore quickly alienated himself from nearly every resident o f the port,
particulady the merchant interest by his tactics, vigor, and methods. Moore proved particularly
interested in tightening customs enforcement to increase his own personal fortunes. As
mentioned above, the most famous case among many, occurred in the Spring o f 1767 -Mien
coastal schooners —Broughton Island Packet and Wambaw —owned by Henry Laurens were
confiscated for n ot properly clearing die port. Laurens became so angry that he n ot only brought
suit against the customs collector, but upon spotting Moore on a crowded Charleston street,
twisted his nose and yelled at him. Laurens’ case came to be heard in Charleston’s new vice
Admiralty court under judge Egerton Leigh (a relative o f Laurens by marriage). In the meantime,
customs collector George Roupell was found guilty by a local jury and ordered to pay damages.
To retaliate, Roupell and P.H. Hatley ceased another ofLaurens’ ships, and offered to release the
vessel if Lauren’s would not collect the damages. Laurens was incensed at this extortion. A
situation which could have been diffused, now worsened into a series o f bitter exchanges and
attacks in the newspaper accusing public officials o f working in their own self-interest. Lauren’s
pamphlets circulated widely in the colonies. Mercantini, Who Should Rule at Home? 23-24; Calhoon
and Weir, “Scandalous History o f Sir Egerton Leigh,” 53; Henry Laurens Extractsfrom the
Proceedings cf the Court of Vice-Admiralty in Charles-Tmm, South Carolina reprinted HE, 6:189 —216
(The Papers of Henry Eaurens (HE) ed. George C. Rogers et al., 16 vols.)
147 On the currency crisis: Correspondence in newspapers indicated that many in England
believed that there would be plenty o f cash in America to pay the taxes. Knight, The American
Colonial Press and the Toimshend Crisis. 24, 70; The South Carolina Gazette and CountryJournal,
December 23, 1766, May 5, 1767; South Carolina and American General Gazette, January 23,1767;
148 The increasing collection o f debts particularly affected Charleston’s planters and mechanics.
See more information above. The South Carolina Gazette September 7, 1769, May 30, 1769; Walsh,
Charleston’s Sons qfEiberty, 42-45; Miscellaneous Court Records, 1770-1771, 98,99, 100,110, 264,
338, 374,392-393; Records o f the Court o f Common Pleas, 1767, 135,178, 211, 212,272-274,
393-396; Minute Book o f the Fellowship Society, 1769-1779; Gayle, “The Nature and Volume o f
Exports from Charieston, 1724-1774,” pp. 31-33; Ship Registers, 1730-1774.
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risk versus rew ard in their reaction to the Townshend Revenue Acts in
1767. For all the earlier toasts to Liberty and "Damnation to the Stamp
Act," residents of Charleston appeared at first, wholly uncertain of
how to react to this new revenue measure.
*

*

*

Chapter 2: Charleston at the Arrival of Townshend Inaction, Contention, Consensus

"Whereas it is expedient that a revenue should be raised in your
Majesty's dominions in America" declared Parliament in the Revenue
Act of 1767, "for making a more certain and adequate provision for
defraying the charge of the administration of justice, and the support
of the civil governm ent.. .and towards further defraying the expenses
of defending, protecting, and securing, the said dominions. ..have
therefore resolved to give and grant unto your Majesty the several
rates and duties herein after mentioned." This preamble to a bill more
commonly refered to in the American colonies as the Townshend
Revenue Act flowed from the pen of the Chancellor of the Exchequer
Charles Townshend as a new plan for rationalizing colonial
administration.149

149 Charles Townshend’s ideas about taxing and regulating American trade had been taking shape
for at least a decade with other ministers and policymakers. The tax schemes were n ot the result
o f unilateral action by Townshend, but had the general support o f the cabinet and Parliament.
Great Britain. The Statutes at Large. ..[from 1225 to 1867] by Da nby Pickering (Cambridge: Printed
by Benthem, for C. Bathhurst); Knight, The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis. 77-78;
Walter H. Conser, Jr. and Ronald M. McCarthy, “Circular Letters, Customs Officers and the
Issue o f Violence: The Background to the Townshend Acts Resistance,” in Resistance, Politics and
the American Strugglefor Independence 1765 1775, ed. by Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy,
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The problem of extracting colonial revenue that plagued King
George Ill's ministers became increasingly urguent by 1767, as the
annual cost of garrisoning the army units in America approached
400,000 pounds, nearly twice the original estimates. The act raised
funds through taxes, which could be defended as trade duties to
colonists' constitutional argum ents against interal taxation.
Additionally, the act provided measures to "more effectually prevent
the clandestine running of goods in the colonies and plantations." This
act appealed to members of Parliament by providing funds, reasserting
imperial authority, and reassuring the royal rule of law and order in
each colony. Conversly, this act threatened colonists in America by
extracting funds, reasserting imperial authority, and underm ining the
political gains of the popularly elected branches of government.150
In October 1767, Boston became the first port to renew non
im portation in response to the Townshend Revenue Act, followed in

DavidJ. Toscano, and Gene Sharp (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1986), 119 39.
150 Charles Townshend’s ideas about taxing and regulating American trade had been taking shape
for at least a decade with other ministers and policymakers. The tax schemes were n ot the result
o f unilateral action by Townshend, but had the general support o f the cabinet and Parliament.
Great Britain. The Statutes at Targe... [from 1225 to 1867] by Da nby Pickering (Cambridge: Printed
by Benthem, for C. Bathhurst); Knight, The American Colonial Tress and the Townshend Crisis 77-78;
Walter H. Conser, Jr. and Ronald M. McCarthy, “Circular Letters, Customs Officers and the
Issue o f Violence: The Background to the Townshend Acts Resistance,” in Resistance, Politics and
the American Strugglefor Independence 1765 1775, ed. by Walter H. Conser, Jr., Ronald M. McCarthy,
David J. Toscano, and Gene Sharp (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1986), 119 39.
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succession by fellow northern ports.151 Although news of these
protests, copies of John Dickinson's influential "Letters from a Farmer
in Pennsylvania," and various other attempts to incite action appeared
on the broadsides of each of Charleston's newspapers, the port
appeared - at least among the propertied whites - largely uninterested
in adopting any scheme of "strict OECONOMY."152 Among the
colony's political elite (i.e. the wealthy planters and merchants) word
of new Regulator disturbances in the backcountry were considered a
far greater threat to South Carolina's economy and stability than a few
small duties on paper, tea, and miscellaneous goods.153 For mechanics
and indebted planters, the opposite appeared true, prom pting somber
rallies under the Liberty Tree to toast Boston and "to see how far they
could follow the laudable example of their brother tradesmen in New
York."154 Meanwhile, merchants calculated the costs and benefits to

151 News that Boston was organizing a non-importation and non-consumption m ovement arrived
in Charleston as early as Novem ber 1767. South Carolina andAmerican General Gazette, November
13, 20, 1767; The South Carolina Gazette, December 14, 1767.
152 The South Carolina Gazette, March 14,1768, April 1,1768; The South Carolina Gazette and County
Journal, J anuary 5, 1768; Knight, The American Colonial Press and theTownshend Crisis. 94, 101-2;
Maier, Resistance to Revolution, 114-5; William Bull to early o f Hillsborough, October 18, 1768,
PRO, reel 10, vol. 32.
153 Internal problems within the colony dominated discussion in die Assembly from 1767 and
throughout much for 1768. By September 1768, writers could declare “apprehension from the
Regulators is over and we are generally convinced that our fears were groundless. Happy people
should we be, if every man might pursue his proper Occupation; but no sooner are we at rest at
home than we are alarmed from Abroad, and the most imminet danger threatens.” Refocusion
attention from the backcountry to the lowcountry, the writer declared “We are no longer
Strangers to the Measures Great Britain is determined to use 'in treating with her loyal colonies in
America.” The South Carolina Gazette, October 11, 1768; The South Caro Ena and American General
Gazette, September 16, 23, 1768.
154 See above. The South CaroEna Galette,]~an.e. 1, 8, 15,1769.
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calls for resum ption from their northern peers.155 Newspapers became
a central forum for the debates over resum ption of non-importation to
occur.156
June 8,1769 - The Press for Action
Through their inaction, Charleston's planters and mechanics,

argued the 'Planter from Pedee/ "bought" the "rod for our own
breech."157 The arrival of Lord Hillsborough's congratulations to "our
friends in trade" for treating Boston's "circular letter...w ith the
SILENT contempt it deserved," provided the author with the spark to
alight a tinderbox in hot, dry summer of 1769. In allowing the
m erchant interest, "mere Bird of Passage., .here to make a fortune," to
speak for the community those interests "fixed to the country" left
Charleston lagging behind "her noble sister colonies" in asserting their
rights within the Empire. While the merchants earn praise from
imperial ministers for "act[ing] like A WISE AND PRUDENT people"
amid the crisis of the Townshend Revenue Act inaction on the part of
South Carolina's planters, mechanics, and freeholders threatened true
English liberty. Now was the time for action, wrote Christopher
Gadsden as the 'Planter from Pedee,' for planters and mechanics

155 The South Carolina and American General Gazette, June 3, 1768, Decem ber 5, 26 17 68.
156 For more examples o f toasts see: South Carolina and American General Gazette, May 13, 1768,
Novem ber 30,1768, December 5,1768; For more on the possible efficacy o f petitions: Knight,
The American Colonial Press and the Townshend Crisis. 121-28; The South Carolina and American General
Gazette, May 6,1768, May 13, 1768; The South Carolina Gazette and Country Journal, January 28, 1768.
157 The South Carolina Gazette, June 8,1769.
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"cannot exp ect the m erchants" to again "desist from im portations"

following Hillsborough's "compliment."158 After two years of delay,
the first June issue of th eSouth Carolina Gazette ushered in a summer
where - at the intersection of self-interest and ideology - a contested
protest reemerged in a city famous for its harm ony.159
June 15,1769 - Charleston's First Agreement
The South Carolina Gazette informed its readers on June 15,1769

"Several Societies of Gentlemen in this Town" had formed in answer
to the Planter's challenge. For over a year, letters from Boston
merchants to their Charleston peers urging cooperation and resistance
"were handed from m an to man," Lieutenant Governor William Bull
Jr. reported to London, with "Silent Neglect."160 Despite exuberant
toasts to liberty and celebrations of English patriots that followed the
repeal of the Stamp Act, the booming port city appeared largely
uninterested in resum ing a regime of "strict OECONOMY" in

i58The South Carolina Gazette, June 22,1769; William Henry Drayton, Letters of Freeman (London,
1771), 1-5.
159 The debate which began this paper, the Planter from Pedee appeared in the South Carolina
Gazette, as did Christopher Gadsden’s subsequent letter as “Pro Grege et Rege” addressed “To
Planters, Mechanicks, and Freeholders o f the province” declaring that never before “were so
glaringly a few against us” than the importers, stigmatized as strangers in the province.
Maier RtR 135, Walsh,Gadsden, “To the Planters, Mechanics,and Freeholders of...South
Carolina,” June 22, 1769, in Gadsden Writims. 77.
SCG. 1769
160 Boston adopted a non-importation agreement in October 1767, and most o f the northern
colonies soon followed. February 1768, Massachusetts sent the circular letter challenging the
constitutionality o f the Townshend Acts and asking for cooperation among the colonies in
securing their repeal. Throughout the colonies, petitions were drawn in response and forwarded
by assemblies to colonial agents in London to be presented to the King. Events beyond the
Townshend Acts themselves, such as their seizure o f John Plancock’s sloop Liberty and the
quartering controversy in Boston and N ew York also hastened pressure for action. Public Records
of South Carolina (British Transcripts), XXXII, p. 56 Cited hereafter as P.R.S.C; Leila Sellers,
CharlestonBusiness on the Eve of the American Revolution. (New York; A m o Press, 1970), 204.
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response to the Townshend Revenue Acts.161 Within days of the
Planter's exhortations and the societies meeting, the first agreement
since the Stamp Act to "purchase no kind of British Goods that can be
manufactured in America," circulated around the Charleston.162
Following weeks of m aneuvering and posturing, the
announcement on June 15 of an association vowing to "cloathe
themselves in hom espn as soon as it can be got," precipitated a tense
standoff within the port.163 "WE, His Majesty's dutiful and loving
Subjects," began Charleston's first renewal of non-importation
published June 22,1769, "being sensibly affected" by "the abject and
wretched condition to which the BRITISH COLONIES are reduced by
several Acts of Parliament," believe we can "most probably
procure...Relief" do "solemnly promise" that "until the Colonies be
restored to their former Freedom, by the Repeal of the said Acts, we
will most strictly abide by the following RESOLUTIONS." After
carefully articulating both grievances and prior petitions, the non
im portation association pledged to "encourage and prom ote...the use
of NORTH-AMERICAN MANUFACTURES" by not importing "Any
of the Manufactures of GREAT-BRITAIN" except from those items
"such as may have been shipped in consequence of former Orders" or

161 The South Carolina Gazette, June 22, 1769.
162 The South Carolina Gazette, June 15, 1769;
163 The South Carolina Gazette, June 1, 1769, July 22, 1769.
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"NEGRO CLOTH, DUFFIL BLANKETS, OSNABURGS,
PLANTATION and WORKMENS TOOLS, POWDER, LEAD, SHOT,
CANVAS, NAILS, SALT, COALS, WOOL CARDS, CARD WIRE,
printed BOOKS and PAMPLETS." Upon signing, association members
agreed not to "raise the Prices" and to "immediately countermand all
Orders."164
In "our Persons, Families, Houses and Furniture," non
im portation supporters vowed to exercise "the utm ost OECONOMY"
in particular vowing to "use NO MOURNING, nor give Gloves and
Scarves at Funerals." Now published and disseminated, the authors
and signers, looked to "every Inhabitant of this Colony, who refuses or
neglects to sign this Agreement w ithin one Month...as no Friend to the
true Interest of the Colony" and swore "upon no Account, at any
Tim e... to purchase from ...such a Person." Those "Gentlemen desirous of
promoting so laudable and at this Time evidently necessary" an association

should immediately "set their Hands" upon "Blank Copies of the above
Agreement" at "TIM O THY'S Office in Broad-Street [printing house of the
South Carolina Gazette]...at Mr. ISAAC MOTTE'S on the Bay, and

CHRISTOPHER GADSDEN, Esq'g where Charleston residents might

164 The South Carolina Gazette, June 22, 1769.
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also view " a List of the Names of many respectable Gentlemen" already
pledged.165
June 30 -J u ly 7 , 1769 - The Merchant Interest Responds
With no association, the merchants appeared to be abdicating

control over the contours of dissent to the planter and mechanic
interests. Facing an aggressive challenge from radical leadership,
anxiously predicting financial hardship under the circulating non
im portation scheme, and fearful of losing their position to a
strengthening planter-mechanic alliance, the Charleston merchants
took action. On June 30, the m erchant interest gathered at Dillon's
Tavern to respond to the sudden resum ption of non-importation.
Aware that remaining aloof only invited more extreme measures, the
large meeting appointed a committee to draft a rival non-importation
plan aimed at both m oderating the mechanics - Charleston's most
radical element - and cementing a traditional planter-merchant
alliance.166
On July 7, the m erchants "in a Number near eighty" presented their
scheme "w ithout one differenting voice." Declaring that "WE ...feeling
ourselves burthened and sensibly affected, by the many Impositions of
Taxes.. fo r the Purpose of raising a Revenue in AMERICA" vow to "adopt

165 The South Carolina Gazette, June 13, 22, 1769.
166 The South Carolina Gazette, June 22, 1769; July 6, 13, 1769; William Henry Drayton, Tetters of
Freeman, 1-5; Walsh, Charleston’s Sons ofTiberty, 47-8; Sellers, Charleston Business on theFve of the
A. merican devolution, 207.
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every Plan o/OECONOMY" and " hereby solemnly promise and
engage... that we will faithfully observe and keep the following

RESOLUTIONS." Seeking a balance between the Stamp Act
precedents, the rival mechanic-planter scheme, and their own interests,
the authors and subscribers agreed "from and after this Day, we will
not im port...and European or East-India Goods...(but such as may be
already ordered and cannot be countermanded) either from GreatBritain, Holland, or any other Place whatsoever, until the first Day of

January, 1778, unless the Revenue-Acts...should be sooner repealed."
Demarcating a clear beginning and ending date, the authors also
allowed "the following Articles" to be imported: "NEGRO
CLOTH.. .striped DUFFIL BLANKETS— OSNABURGS - coarse white
LINENS, not exceeding One Shilling and Six Pence Sterling per Yard—
CANVAS—BOLTING CLOTHS—DRUGS and FAMILY
MEDICINES—PLANTATION and WORKMENS TOOLS - NAILS WIRE CARDS- FIRE ARMS - BAR STEEL - GUN POWDER - SHOTLEAD - FLINTS - SALT - COALS - SALT-PETRE - MILL and
GRIND-STONES." The m erchant's non-importation association
adopted similar language to Charleston's Stamp Act precedent, but
allowed a greater number of goods to be imported. Beyond the
extensive list of exceptions, signers agreed to countermand orders,
"not purchase from any Masters of Vessels, transient Persons, or Non-
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Subscribers" forbidden goods "excepting COALS and SALT," to sell
all items "at the same Rates" as before, that "from and after the first
Day of January 1770, to th e first Day of January 1771 we will not
IMPORT, BUY or SELL, any NEGROES that shall be brought into this
province from AFRICA" nor after "the first Day of October next, any
NEGROES that shall be imported from the WEST-INDIA ISLANDS, or
ANY OTHER PLACE, unless the said Acts should be sooner repealed,"
and added "WINES" to the list of forbidden good due to the "heavy
Duty" imposed upon them. Those subscribers "who shall not, strictly
and literally, adhere" to the resolutions "will deserve to be treated
with the utm ost Contem pt."167 The merchants tipped their hats
towards small merchants, planters, and even mechanics in shaping the
association's requirements, but in whole, the association protected the
economic interests of its promoters.168 The inclusion of specific
deadlines served to limit the scope of protest. As the meeting
adjourned, the merchants felt confident of the successful adoption of
their association by the community in Charleston.169
Eager to press their position, the merchants released an open
response to the "Planter from Pedee" alongside the publication their

167 TheSouth Carolina Gazette, July 13,1769; TheSouth Carolina Gazette and CountryJournal, July 10,
25, 1769.
168 j'fog South Carolina Gazette, July 9, 13, 1769; Sellers, Charleston Business on the Eve of the American
Revolution, 56.
169 The South Carolina Gazette, July 9, 1769.
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newly penned non-importation association. Published in Charleston's
three major newspapers, the "MERCHANTS OF CHARLESTOWN"
systematically refuted the accusations "Published in Mr. Timothy's
Gazette on the 22d of last Month." The merchants offered this
"Vindication" not for the "anonymous Writer," who "we regard
w ith .. .indifference," but to "lay before the publick" their position
supported by justifications of protest in radical Whig tradition. In
response to the "Aspersions thrown" on the merchants for treating the
circular letter w ith "silent Contempt," Charleston factors argued that
fewer than "a Fifth Part of the People in Trade had an Opportunity of
seeing The Letter." Indeed, the Planter from Pedee took "uncommon
Pains to Misrepresent us to our Fellow-subjects" as "Strangers, many
of but a few years standing.. .who have never show n.. .any Thing
but. ..Regard for ourselves and our own private interests." Had he
"been disposed to give himself any Time for Recollection," the
merchants responded, the Planter would certainly have remembered
the times that "the Merchants alone...boldly stood forth, and, at an
enormous Expense solely defrayed by themselves" protesting and
defeating "a plan that w ould have subjected the Planting Interest to
inconceivable Hardships."170

170 The South Carolina Gazette, July 22, 1769; TheSouth Carolina and A.merica General Gazette,July 17,
1769.
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Once established in their past protest credentials, the merchants'
response continued by denouncing the m ethods of the "Planter from
Pedee" and the first non-importation association in Real Whig
tradition. The mechanic's agreement represented little more than "an
unjust Attem pt of one Part of the Com m unity.. .to throw a Burthen on
the Rest more grievous th an .. .the most arbitrary Minister of the most
despotic King." The new motto "SIGN or BE RUINED," adopted by
those supporting the "Planter from Pedee," "strikes at the Welfare of
each Individual" embodying "nothing but a Spirit of Tyranny." The
first "Plan of Economy" provides for but "two Parts of the
Community" by "necessarily increase[ing] the Landholders Estates"
and allowing the import of "such Articles as they and the Mechanicks
indispensably want," leaving "the third" - the merchants - "subjected
to infinite Hardships and Distress." If, suggested the merchants citing
common belief of English Whig radicals, "hardship m ust be borne for
the general Good, each individual should be consulted" and the
resulting "Plan adopted...w ould make the Burden equal."171 Thus the
second non-importation association should be adopted as the only
m utually consensual - and therefore legitimate - scheme of protest.
Contest

171 The merchants also respond through a letter from PRO LIBERATATE ET LEGE. The South
Carolina and America General Gazette,]\Ay 7, 10, 1769; TA South Carolina Gazette, July 13, 1769; The
South Carolina Gazette and CountryJournal, July 7, 1769.
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The South Carolina Gazette broadside announced the merchants'
association and their letter below a reprinting of the first non
importation association (including an additional, italicized clause
urging unity behind a single protest organization) and a preemptive
response by "A Mechanic."172 On a single broadside, Charleston
residents faced two contested protest associations. Why would "ANY
PLANTER, MECHANIC, or OTHERinhabitant, DISTINCT^rom their
body" subscribe to "their Resolutions" which "do not contain a single

syllable for ENCOURAGING AMERICAN MANUFACTURES." As
both sides jockeyed for support, the Mechanic continued that, although
the merchants complain that " each individual should be consulted," but
"Were anybesides MERCHANTS, invited to their meeting...as at ours?
That "so unpardonable an omission happened," the community must
"unanimously adhere to our FIRST PLAN, with exemplary firmness."

Only in consensus for the first plan, 'A Mechanic' argued, could the
"ESTABLISH-MENT of American Manufactures" occur.173 The debate
borrowed claims of legitimacy from traditions of English dissent but
represented the economic self-interest of their authors.174
Consensus

172 By this time, the publisher o f The South Carolina Gazette, Peter Timothy, was an ardent
supporter o f the radical interests, as will be examined below.
173 The South Carolina Gazette. July 13, 1769; Richard Walsh, Charleston’s Sons ofTiberty, 48.
174 Legitimate resistance, it was believed, must involved the body o f the people, must take
peaceful forms over violence, and must confine itself to proscribed limits. Maier, From Resistance to
Revolution, 114.
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"During the Fortnight past," reported The South Carolina and
American General Gazette, "several Proposals have been m ade...for

stopping the Importation of Goods...till the Revenue Acts shall be
Repealed" with "many" already signing "Resolutions for that
Purpose."175 Even as merchants and mechanics exchanged bitter
accusations - readers learned of several "proposals" underw ay "for
One General" agreement.176 The drive for consensus stemmed in large
part from common concerns that mechanics, merchants, and planters
all shared about renewed disorder by slaves and sailors in the port.
Past experience during the Stamp Act Protest and Whig tradition
stressed that legitimate resistance involved the body of the people, in
peaceful forms, defining clear limits to agitation.177
The individuals who joined non-importation efforts in Charleston
genuinely believed in their community's ability to force Parliament to
repeal the Townshend Revenue Acts through protest, and so the
central question became deciding upon the most effective form for that
protest. In the period of negotiations, mechanics and the planters held
"the whip hand." Overtures for a combined agreement by merchants
fearing more extreme actions resulted in a joint committee to draft a

175 TheSouth Carolina and American General Gazette. July 4, 1769; The South Carolina Gazette and
Country Journal ,]\A y 4, 25, 1769.
176 The South Carolina and American General Gazette. July 17, 1769.
177 Maier, From Resistance to Revolution, 114.
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uniform agreement distilling the essentials of the two rival
agreements.178
On July 22, 1769, serving as president of the public meeting
Christopher Gadsden read aloud a new compromised plan. By
acclaim, the crowd of planters, mechanics, and merchants voted
"unanimously" to support a third non-importation agreement which,
reported The South Carolina and American General Gazette "we have no
reason to doubt will be satisfactory to...every Freeman in the
Province."179 The agreement combined the first and second non
im portation associations, ultimately granting greater allowances for
the merchant and planter economic interests, while expanding the
power of the mechanics. The conflict over protest that emerged on
June 15 as mechanics drafted a non-importation association in direct
opposition to the merchants' inaction, developed into a period with
two competing organizations, and ultimately ended w ith an agreement
amenable to the merchant and planter interests, that endowed
mechanics for the first time w ith equal political power in the
association, a power they w ould continue to exercise throughout the
Revolution.

178 Sellers. Charleston business on the Eve of Revolution. 208,219.
179 Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty, 49.
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After reiterating the grievances enumerated in the first agreement,
the signers "whose names are under-written" agreed to "most strictly
abide the following RESOLUTIONS.. .until the colonies be restored to
their former freedom, by the repeal of the said acts." To acknowledge
the mechanics' demands, signers promised to "encourage and promote
the use of NORTH AMERICAN MANUFACTURES in general, and
those of this province in particular," with vendors applying "the same
rates a heretofore." As well, the importation, buying, or selling of "any
NEGROES. ..brought into this Province from Africa " would go into
effect "After the first day of January 1770," while the moratorium of
the importation of "any NEGROES...from West-Indies or any other
place" began the "first day of October next."

In negotiations, the list of goods excepted grew to include all the
exceptions of the m erchant's association as well as "BOLTING
CLOTHS" and " Fish-Hooks." All non importation members pledged to

observe "the utm ost oeconomy in our persons" and "particularly" to
"give no mourning or gloves or scarfs at funerals." Within a month,
"any resident" of South Carolina "that refuses or neglects to sign the
agreement," w ould receive no business from signers. While
borrowing the language of previous agreements - that "every
subscriber who shall not strictly and literally adhere to this
agreem ent.. .out to be treated with the utmost contempt," a new
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committee of enforcement strengthened the measures within the
association.180
The committee to enforce the boycott of British goods reflected as
well the blending of the two competing non-importation schemes. At
the "General Meeting of Inhabitants" it "was determined, That the
General Resolutions" of non-importation "should be most strictly
adhered to" with the "General Committee" empowered "to take every
necessary and justifiable Step for preventing the least Deviation
therefrom."181 Formed on July 22, the South Carolina Non-Importation
Association Committee contained thirteen representatives from each of
the three interested parties: the planters, the merchants, and the
mechanics, thus securing mechanics equal power in enforcement.182
Charged with gathering signatures and policing signers, the
Committee collected 142 names by August, with the list ultimately
growing to 268 individuals.183
The Resumption of Non-Importation
180 TheSouth Carolina and America General Gazette,} uly 24, 1769; The South Carolina Gazette, J uly 22,
1769.
181 TheSouth Carolina Gazette, September 7 , 1769-.
182 The mechanics w ho were appointed to the committee included Thomas Young, John,
Matthews, J oseph Dill, John Fullerton, William Trusler, John Pure, Theodore Trezvant, Bernard
Beekman, Cato Ash, Simon Berwick, Joseph Verree, Daniel Cannon, and Tunis Tebout. As an
extra-legal body, the mechanic’s participation on this committee o f enforcement established the
precedent for their equal inclusion throughout the imperial crisis and Revolution. Interesting to
note here, that leadership in this protest in no way presages a particular allegiance during the
Revolutionary War. The South Carolina Gazette, July 13,27 1769; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty.
50.
183
South Carolina Gazette, October 5,1769; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons of Liberty. 52; Bull to
Hillsborough, Charleston, March 6 and October 20, 1770, PRO, CO 5/393, ff. 22,119; Maier,
From Resistance to Revolution, 122,131-2.
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The committee to enforce the boycott of British goods reflected the
blending of the two competing non-importation schemes. At the
"General Meeting of Inhabitants" it "was determined, That the General
Resolutions" of non-importation "should be most strictly adhered to"
with the "General Committee" empowered "to take every necessary
and justifiable Step for preventing the least Deviation therefrom."184
Formed on July 22, the South Carolina Non-Importation Association
Committee contained thirteen representatives from each of the three
interested parties: the planters, the merchants, and the mechanics, thus
securing mechanics equal power in enforcement.185 Charged with
gathering signatures and policing signers, the Committee collected 142
names by August, with the list ultimately growing to 268 individuals.
By December 1769, few sails could be spotted coming or going
from Charleston Harbor, and Peter Timothy reported that only thirty
"irreconcilable" individuals remained in the port.186 The newly formed
committee of enforcement adopted the motto of "Sign or Die"

184 TheSouth Carolina Gazette, September 7 , 1769-.
185 The mechanics w ho were appointed to the committee included Thomas Young, John,
Matthews, Joseph Dill, John Fullerton, William Trusler, John Pure, Theodore Trezvant, Bernard
Beekman, Cato Ash, Simon Berwick,Joseph Verree, Daniel Cannon, and Tunis Tebout. As an
extra-legal body, the mechanic’s participation on this committee o f enforcement established the
precedent for their equal inclusion throughout the imperial crisis and Revolution. Interesting to
note here, that leadership in this protest in no way presages a particular allegiance during the
Revolutionary War. The South Carolina Gazette, 13, 27 July 1769; Walsh. Charleston’s Sons ofTiberty.
50.
186 Walsh SoL 51 (Fraser, Walter PPP 45)
Another witness to these happenings claimed that few ships were inte harbor in Decemeber, a
time when the port was usually bustling. Moreover, figures show a marked decline in the overseas
trade for the period o f the resistance to the Townsend Act -W alsh SoL 51, David MacPherson,
Annals oCommerce (4 vol.; Edinburg, 1805).
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(sometimes "Sign or be Ruined") and harsher tactics for tactics for
enlisting recalcitrant non-subscribers and punishing violators than
their Stamp Act model.187 Although the summer began with
individuals arriving a protest based upon their own ideological
concerns and economic self interests, the push for consensus among
the propertied interests due to fear of a massive slave and sailor
uprisings enabled a more rigorous enforcement than many joiners
thought either would occur or was necessary.188 The associations
required all trade relations be suspended within one month, and
delinquent subscribes would be handed by the elected Committee. The
Committee decided that since "it was determined, That the General
Resolutions...should be most strictly adhered to" strict enforcement
was necessary to achieve results.189 In addition to this stricter
enforcement, Charleston's now more powerful mechanic class
organized to plans to help domestic manufacturers, including schemes
to establish a paper mill and provide goods such as "Liberty

is? Walsh SoL 50 - SCG - November 1 6 ,2 3 ,3 0 1769, December 7 1 769,Februrary 1,14,
September 14, 27, Oxrovwe 3 ,1 1 ,1 8 ,2 5 , Novem ber 1,8, 1700. Pr.R.,XXXII, 103, 200-201 SC
G azjuly 27, 1769
188 SCG Sept. 7, 1769
189 The South Carolina Gazette, September 7,1769, November 1 6 ,2 3 ,3 0 ,1 7 6 9 , December 7, 1769,
February 1,14, 1769; P.R.S.C., XXXII, 103, 200-201.
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umbrellas" for "Lovers and Encouragers of American
M anufacturers."190
Within Charleston, the voices of opposition - like William
Henry Drayton, John Gordon, and William W ragg - at first expressed
their positions in the newspaper, but soon found themselves not
simply marginalized, but no longer part of the community. In the
backcountry as well, m en like Charles W oodmason complained that
the Sons of Liberty and fellow Charleston residents did not care "who
may starve so that they can but eat - who sinks, so they swim, who
laborers and are heavy laden, so they can keep their Equipages. Their
throats bellow one thing. But their hands would execute the
reverse. ..These are the Sons of Liberty."191 The economic interests and
ideological divides beteen the merchant, planter, and mechanic
interest before the Townshend Revenue Acts, deeply influenced the
variety of responses to the legislation and ultimately shaped what
individuals believed they were participating in during the resum ption
of non-importation.
*

*

*

Conclusion

190 The South Carolina Gazette, March 7, 1769, July 6, 1769, August 10,1769, September 28, 1769,
Novem ber 30,1769, January 4, 11, 18, 1770,June 7, 1770, August 16,1770; Walsh, Charleston’s
Sons ofTiberty, 52.
191 Quoted in Robert Woody, “Christopher Gadsden and the Stamp Act,” Proceedings cf the South
Carolina Historical Assocaition (1939), 9; P.R.S.C. XXXII, 415-417, 434-435.
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In a summer of 1769, when drought threatened "the CORN,
throughout the province," residents of the port of Charleston
experienced an extraordinarily blistering few weeks.192 In a city that
prided itself on "Harmony," the summer of 1769 proved anything but
harmonious. From inaction to conflict to consensus, the resum ption of
protest in Charleston forced each resident of the harbor tow n to
question their relationship to the British Empire and to one another.
For every individual, the Townshend Revenue Acts forced a
reconsideration of the port's place within the British empire, the city
elite's persuasive power in London, and their relationship to British
political traditions. This m oment emerged from a colonial history rich
with political strife, an economic depression literally ruining planters
and merchants, as well as, the constant fear of disorder from sailors
and slaves. Far from harm ony - this period of Charleston's history is
best characterized by near constant contention, collusion, and disunion
within the community.
In the summer of 1769, Charleston's newspaper broadsides and
resident's private correspondence consistently echoed an anxiety
unprecedented five years earlier. The period following the Seven
Years War, as the British government sought to regularize the empire,
Charleston suffered an identity crisis that deeply shaped their
192 The South Carolina Gazette, July 13,1769.
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participation in protest. This essay attem pted to recreate how
contemporaries understood this m oment of contested protest and their
own involvement. To dissect how colonists came to protest, this paper
examined how Charleston residents understood their position within
the British Empire, traced how conflict over protest arrived amid
inaction, and uncovered the drive by the anxious whites towards
consensus. In capturing the range of possibilities for Charleston
citizens, the narrative suggests how individuals calculated risk versus
rew ard at the intersection of ideology and self-interest to participate in
protest.193
Where once the city conceived of itself as a central player within
the web of empire, after the Seven Years War, suddenly the port
appeared to be just another periphery in the eyes of London
policymakers. As they engaged in protest, Charleston's interested
classes continued to believe in their ability to persuade English officials
to change imperial policies. This belief faded at varying rates for port
residents - quickly for those mechanics injured by the currency crisis
and more gradually for those merchants who still relied upon imperial
trade networks. Even as they protested, Charlestonians engaged in a
tradition within the Empire, linking their own cause with others in

193 This paper seeks to complicate the narrative established by Pauline Maier’s From Resistance to
Revolution: Colonial Radicals and the Development ojAmerican Opposition to Britain, 1765- 1776. (New
Yo rk: N orton 1972).
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England, Scotland, and Ireland. Charleston residents participated in a
wider, Atlantic conversation, one that increasingly appeared ignored
by those on the far side of the Gulf Stream.
Up the coast from Charleston, the tobacco port of Norfolk - for
example - echoes m any of the tensions and drive to consensus found
in Charleston. Seven of the twenty Norfolk and Portsmouth
Committee of Correspondence members decrying the "tyranny" of
King George during the Townshend Crisis, returned to Britain as
loyalists after the war. Two members of the Committee actively fought
against American independence, aiding the British army in securing
financing and a fleet of privateers to harass the very port trade they
once sought to protect.194 No single trajectory defined allegiance in
pre-Revolutionary port towns; understanding the dynamism of these
communities in protest reveals more accurately the process of
revolution.195 Before even connecting to other colonies, capturing how
the community itself interacted, points to how protest occurred within
the British Empire.196

194 Hast, Adele. Eqyalism in Revolutionary Virginia: The Norfolk Area and the Eastern Shore. (Ann
Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1979.) 16.
195 Understanding the changing faces o f protest —from the non-importation associations o f the
Stamp Act to the Coercive Acts —avoids the narrow binary o f individuals as patriot or loyalist.
Treatment o f former protest leaders reveals not only latent antagonisms but also a high degree o f
tolerance for dissenting opinion within the two communities. With economic connections
spanning all areas o f American Colonies, the Caribbean, the British Isles, and the European
continent, the cash crop merchant factors’ participation and abandonment illustrates not only
how economic motivation underlies protest, but also the class dynamic within port communities.
196 In reading the contemporary newspapers and letters, it seems nearly impossible to conclude
that participating in non-importation built trust or developed common understandings. From the
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Beyond simply restoring contingency in the protests prior to the
American Revolution, by examining this contested moment of protest
within Charleston, it is possible to reconstruct how contemporaries
conceived of their moment, their rights, their position, and even
themselves w ithin the British Empire.
In choosing to protest - in weighing the potential of risk versus
the possibilities of rew ard - Charleston's experience in the summer of
1769 reveals how people oriented themselves within the community,
colony, and Empire. That individuals in Charleston each arrived a
different conclusions from this calculation should not be surprising,
nor should the fact that each individual brought different meanings to
joining, participating, and violating the association - but as historians,
we consistently overlook the dynamics of protest to paint an inevitable
trajectory from resistance to revolution. While the story of this
particular summer, in this odd Southern city, appears exceptional, the
experience of this port also points towards a more complex picture of
protest in a colonial world. Individuals in Charleston - like those in
Savannah, Philadelphia, Antigua, Jamaica, St. Christopher, Beaufort,
and elsewhere - based their actions and decision upon a calculus of
origins to the enforcement, each individual in Charleston believed they signed on, participated in,
violated, or resisted fundamentally different associations than others within the community. No
consensus existed within the port to build towards a common revolution in the manner that T.H.
Breen or Pauline Maier describe. Choice was part o f the equation, but coercion and marginalizing
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economic self-interest, political ideology, and the nature of the
community.
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